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ABSTRACT 
The United States has paid a great deal of attention and analysis to China and its 
involvement in Africa in its effort to address great power competition. Great power 
competition, however, involves three countries: the United States, China, and Russia. 
While it is clear that Russia is deliberately targeting its investment in Africa to gain a 
competitive advantage in the region, information is limited on the motivations for its 
involvement in Africa and whether its involvement threatens American interests. We 
do know that the majority of current Russian engagement in Africa consists of 
military technical cooperation (MTC). This thesis aims to explain the motivations of 
Russian MTC in Africa from 2000 to 2018. Two case studies, Sudan and Algeria, 
illuminate the variety of motivations but ultimately show Russian MTC is most likely 
motivated by an interplay of economic enrichment for domestic elites, which maintains 
President Putin’s hold on power. 
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I. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States is concerned about great power competition (GPC), or 
international strategic competition, in Africa. According to the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy, “inter-state competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. 
national security.”1 While the United States has paid a great deal of attention and analysis 
to China and its involvement in Africa, great power competition involves three countries: 
the United States, China, and Russia. As former national security advisor John Bolton 
claimed in December 2018, Russia and China “are rapidly expanding their financial and 
political influence across Africa. Both Russia and China are deliberately and aggressively 
targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United 
States.”2 However, while it is clear that Russia aims to have a competitive advantage in 
Africa through strategic investments, information is limited on the motivations for their 
involvement in Africa and whether their involvement threatens American interests.  
We do know that the majority of current Russian engagement in Africa consists of 
military technical cooperation (MTC). In 1993, Russian military doctrine defined MTC as 
“exporting and importing of weapons and military hardware, military technologies and 
results of scientific and technical projects in the military sphere.”3 MTC also includes 
“sending military advisors and specialists on official trips… Implementing commissioned 
and joint research and design projects to create new types of weapon and military 
hardware… [providing] technical assistance in building military facilities and defense 
enterprises… [and] other military-technical projects and services”4 including private 
military companies (PMCs). MTC is not a new phenomenon, and Russia has been engaging 
 
1 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018), 14. 
2 “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s 
New Africa Strategy,” White House, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/. 
3 Baidya Bikash Basu, “Russian Military‐Technical Cooperation: Structures and Processes,” Strategic 
Analysis 25, no. 3 (July 15, 2008): 437, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160108458967. 
4 Basu. 
2 
in MTC in Africa since the Cold War. But Russian MTC in Africa has been growing over 
the past two decades, resurging through signing military cooperation deals, completing 
diplomatic tours, and increasing military support to regimes.5 Today,  
Russia is the second largest supplier of arms in the world and a major 
supplier of arms to African countries ... Russia’s sales of weaponry to 
African countries in 2017 had doubled compared to 2012. China and the 
U.S. are also crucial weapons suppliers but in Africa they fall behind Russia, 
which supplied 39 percent of Africa’s imported arms between 2017 and 
2013.6 
This increase in Russian MTC is the most visible type of Russian engagement in 
Africa, and therefore the most important type of action for understanding Russia’s 
motivations for its increased engagement on the continent. To that end, this thesis examines 
the patterns of Russian MTC in Africa to answer the question: What are the motivations 
for Russian MTC in Africa? 
The thesis concludes that Russian motivations for MTC in Africa stem from a desire 
to economically satisfy the Putin regime’s domestic clients. In addition, this thesis rejects 
gaining access to natural resources and increase market for Russian exports as motivators 
of Russian MTC in Sudan and Algeria as the evidence did not support either hypothesis 
for either country. Overall, this thesis finds support for both political and economic 
explanations for Russian MTC; however, many of the political hypotheses resulted in 
mixed outcomes. Finally, the remainder of the hypotheses that were positive for one 
country and negative for another show the variation between political and economic 
motivations for Russian MTC across Sudan and Algeria.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Understanding the motivations for Russian MTC in Africa is essential because the 
Trump administration’s foreign policy addresses U.S. interests in Africa through the lens 
 
5 Aaron Ross, “How Russia Moved Into Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Moscow Times, October 17, 2018, 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/17/how-russia-moved-into-sub-saharan-africa-a63213. 
6 Landry Signé, “Vladimir Putin Is Resetting Russia’s Africa Agenda to Counter the U.S. and China,” 
Brookings, October 22, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/vladimir-putin-is-resetting-russias-
africa-agenda-to-counter-the-us-and-china/. 
3 
of GPC, shifting America’s focus from counterterrorism to combatting Russian and 
Chinese influence in Africa. GPC was an anchoring theme in Bolton’s 2018 speech on the 
administration’s New Africa Strategy.7 He identified the Trump administration’s primary 
concern as the rapid expansion of China’s and Russia’s “financial and political influence 
across Africa.”8 Bolton claimed that Russia, particularly, “[is] rapidly expanding [its] 
financial and political influence across Africa [and] deliberately and aggressively targeting 
[its] investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States.”9  
In addition to expressing this concern, Ambassador Bolton identified President 
Trump’s three U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa: “Promot[e] prosperity in Africa and 
America … Strengthen security … to counter threats to American and African security … 
[and] Strive for stability to support progress toward good governance and self-reliance.”10 
For the United States to achieve these three goals, it needs African states to be secure and 
autonomous. A threat to the autonomy of African states is therefore a threat to U.S. national 
security. Russian MTC in Africa can create political and economic ties to Russia which 
could compromise African state autonomy due to Russian influence and potential 
interference. Bolton went so far as to say that: “the predatory practice pursued by [Russia] 
stunt[s] economic growth in Africa; threaten[s] the financial independence of African 
nations; inhibit[s] opportunities for U.S. investment; interfere[s] with U.S. military 
operations; and pose[s] a significant threat to U.S. national security interests.”11 Russian 
MTC may be one of these predatory practices.  
This perspective is consistent with other U.S. government perceptions. Members of 
the House Armed Services Committee claim that “keeping forces in Africa is specifically 
needed to counter China [and Russia], whose influence is growing on the continent.”12 In 
 
7 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton.” 
8 White House. 
9 White House. 
10 White House. 
11 White House. 
12 Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, “Esper’s Africa Drawdown Snags on Capitol Hill,” Defense News, 
January 19, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/01/17/smith-thornberry-join-
congressional-pushback-on-espers-africa-troop-drawdown-plan/. 
4 
addition, according to the 2017 National Security Strategy, “ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and their 
affiliates operate on the continent and have increased the lethality of their attacks, expanded 
into new areas, and targeted U.S. citizens and interests.”13 Based on these perceptions, 
because the U.S. has an enduring interesting in fighting terrorism and will therefore remain 
in Africa, we should have a better understanding of what adversaries like Russia are doing 
in Africa. Otherwise the United States will very likely find itself in the same geopolitical 
situation as it did with China. While the United States observed that China’s involvement 
within the continent was increasing, it assumed Chinese involvement was benign. As a 
result, even though the United States has been competing in GPC for at least the past 
decade, it may have misunderstood the implications of the spread of Chinese influence in 
Africa, which created a dependence on China and an opportunity for China to be a leading 
economic power in Africa.  
This thesis is an attempt to prevent the same mistake and mitigate potential 
misunderstanding of Russian involvement in Africa. Although scholars have written about 
Russian activity in Africa for years, there is still limited understanding of the intent and 
implications of this involvement. Better understanding of Russian motivations can help 
determine the degree to which Russian actions are a threat to U.S. foreign policy interests 
in Africa or to U.S. national security. MTC is especially instructive because it is the best 
documented activity in Africa and the favored Russian activity within Africa.  
This issue has immediate policy relevance. In December 2019, Defense Secretary 
Mark Esper put forward a plan to reduce the United States’ military presence in Africa. 
This potential drawdown of Africa Command (AFRICOM) has created concern among 
AFRICOM employees. Pivoting away from Africa could have negative implications for 
U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa because it could allow great power competitors to fill 
the gap the Americans leave behind, or worse, provide an opportunity for terrorist groups 
to fill the gap as ISIS did in Iraq.14 Before deciding to continue to draw down AFRICOM, 
 
13 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
14 Helene Cooper, “Plan to Cut U.S. Troops in West Africa Draws Criticism From Europe,” New York 
Times, January 14, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/world/africa/milley-troops-
withdraw.html. 
5 
U.S. government leadership should have a better understanding of the consequences that 
leaving would have on American interests in Africa as well as its potential global 
consequences.  
Russia, meanwhile, sees the American drawdown and pivot to the Pacific as an 
opportunity to increase its influence in Africa. According to The Moscow Times, American 
“trade with the continent has halved in the past decade, though much of that is due to U.S. 
shale replacing oil imports from Africa. Diplomatic posts have gone unfilled and a task 
force based in CAR [Central African Republic] tracking warlord Joseph Kony left last 
year.” In response, Russia has spearheaded several new engagements in Africa, such as 
establishing programs for weapons and training in counterterrorism and anti-piracy, 
developing mineral deals with Sudan and Zimbabwe, support contracting efforts in CAR, 
Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya. In 2018 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited five 
African countries.15 These visits included a South African summit and a stop in Rwanda, 
the chair of the African Union.16 These engagements are important to address because they 
illustrate Russian resurgence into Africa and the restored importance of engaging with 
African countries that was absent in the post-Cold War era.  
Not only does this thesis identify the motivations behind Russian MTC in Africa, 
but it illuminates the priorities of Russian foreign policy by parsing out this favored activity 
in Africa. In doing so, it clarifies how Russia sees its role within GPC and the world. In 
addition, this thesis provides a broader sense about when countries engage in MTC and 
their reasons for doing so. While there is an existing body of knowledge on GPC, there is 
a gap in current MTC studies with regard to Russian MTC in Africa. This thesis helps to 
fill that gap. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature offers two general explanations for Russian MTC: economic aims 
and political aims. Economic explanations argue that Russia uses MTC to sustain its 
 
15 Ross, “How Russia Moved Into Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
16 Ross. 
6 
defense industry after the collapse of the USSR to present day. Political explanations, on 
the other hand, state that Russia uses MTC as a tool to facilitate political connections and 
exert influence over the political decision-making of other countries. According to the 
literature on Russian MTC, the country’s primary motive has varied over three time 
periods: the Cold War era, the post-Cold War (or Yeltsin) era, and the Putin era (1990s 
through current era). This literature review briefly addresses the Cold War era and Yeltsin 
era, but mostly focuses on the transition to the Putin era and current Putin policies to 
illuminate the current body of scholarly work on MTC in Africa.  
1. Motivations of Russian Foreign Policy in Africa 
a. Political Motivations (Cold War) 
During the Cold War, Russian arms trade and Russian export of military technology 
were “largely driven by strategic and political rather than commercial interests.”17 
According to Schmidt, “Moscow deemed the removal of colonial capitalism necessary for 
Third World advancement, and the triumph of national liberation over imperialism a 
precondition for the victory of socialism over capitalism.”18 The USSR engaged in MTC 
with countries as a means of waging proxy wars against the West to exert political influence 
over African countries. Schmidt adds, “Khrushchev’s goal was not to establish community 
states but simply to increase Soviet influence in the new nations and to diminish that of the 
west,” effectively expanding the Russian sphere of influence and combatting growing 
Western power.19  
b. Economic Motivations (Yeltsin era) 
After the fall of the USSR, the primary motive for Russian MTC changed from 
politics to economics. The newly established Russian Federation needed money to 
maintain its economy and defense programs. Arms were in demand across the world and 
 
17 Baidya Bikash Basu, “Russian Military‐technical Cooperation: Structures and Processes,” Strategic 
Analysis 25, no. 3 (June 2001): 437, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160108458967. 
18 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139021371. 
19 Schmidt, 25. 
7 
gave Russia the opportunity to demonstrate its advanced technology to other countries. 
Moscow focused on its weapons trade after being “a major military supplier to African 
governments during the Cold War.”20 Basu argues that, after the Cold War, Russia 
continued weapons exports in order to revive the Russian defense enterprise, ultimately 
shifting Russia’s MTC approach to a commercial interest.21 The arms trade also enabled 
Russian moves into other sectors in Africa, specifically energy, mining, and infrastructure 
development.22 
During the 1990s, Africa mostly fell off of Russia’s foreign policy agenda due to 
Russia’s internal economic challenges. Russian foreign policy towards developing 
countries in the 1990s focused on the major rising economies of the time: Brazil, India, 
China, and South Africa, which later became known as the BRICS.23 According to Pham, 
Russian leaders blamed “Russia’s economic ills [on] the cost of aid that the Soviet Union 
had bestowed on Africa and other developing regions.”24 This led then-President Boris 
Yeltsin to end massive foreign spending, which at the time arose in part from Russia 
supplying technical and economic assistance programs to thirty-seven African countries.25 
Since Russia was looking towards developing closer ties with the West through 
international organizations, it also had no incentive to provide MTC for proxy wars. 
 
20 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa After the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, 
and the War on Terror, Ohio University Research in International Studies. Global and Comparative Studies 
Series, no. 19 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018), 48. 
21 Basu, “Russian Military‐technical Cooperation,” 437. 
22 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa After the Cold War, 48. 
23 Syed Adnan Ali Shah, “Russo-India Military-Technical Cooperation,” Institute of Strategic Studies 
Islamabad 21, no. 4 (2001): 42; Biplob Gogoi, “Military-Technical Collaboration Between India and 
Russia: An Overview of the Post-Soviet Period,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 58, 
no. 3–4 (July 1, 2002): 303–20, https://doi.org/10.1177/097492840205800312; Deon Geldenhuys, “The 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between South Africa and Russia,” Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa 37, no. 2 (November 1, 2015): 28; Imanuela Ionescu, “Brazil-Russia Military-Technical 
Cooperation,” Army University Press, November 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/
Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Ionescu-Brazil-Russia/. 
24 J. Peter Pham, “Back to Africa: Russia’s New African Engagement,” in Africa and the New World 
Era, ed. Jack Mangala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan U.S., 2010), 73, https://doi.org/10.1057/
9780230117303_5. 
25 Pham, 73. 
8 
Furthermore, proxy wars ended because other Cold War actors were no longer interested 
in fighting against an enemy that no longer existed.  
Russia continued to engage in MTC with South Africa because it was one of the 
rising economies of the day, but it limited its involvement in other African countries. 
Outside of South Africa, Russia’s military involvement was limited to exporting surplus 
weapons systems and arms. At the time, Russia framed this support as trade and not 
MTC.26 It is evident however, that Russia’s motivation during this period was primarily 
economic because Russia wanted to capitalize on any measure to increase its economic 
status after the fall of the USSR. But because Russia was interested in rising economies as 
a whole and not specifically South Africa, Russia’s MTC with the country was minimal, 
resulting in “receiving little exposure in South Africa and vice versa; the two societies 
remain enigmas to one another.”27 This changed, however, in the 2000s. 
c. Political Motivations (Putin era) 
Russian engagement in Africa started to shift again in the 2000s, after Putin came 
to power. While Yeltsin had focused on developing relationships with the West and 
Russia’s BRICS partnerships, Putin started a resurgence of Russian activity in Africa. The 
limited literature on this topic, most of which does not focus on MTC specifically, 
identifies political motivators for Russia’s increased activity in the international arena. 
These motivators focus on Russia’s desire “to be recognized as a great power with its own 
distinct sphere of influence.”28 In addition, Russia has a “desire to see U.S. global influence 
curbed and, if possible, scaled back.”29 These political foreign policy motivators in Africa 
are echoed within the literature’s motivations for Russian MTC in Africa.  
 
26 Pham, 74. 
27 Geldenhuys, “The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between South Africa and Russia,” 139. 
28 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (Department of Defense), Russian Strategic Intentions 
(Washington, D.C., 2019), 1, https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016b-a5a1-d241-adff-fdf908e00001. 
29 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (Department of Defense), 2. 
9 
2. Motivations for Russian MTC in Africa 
a. Political Motivations 
Political arguments that focus specifically on Russian MTC in Africa assert that 
Russia uses MTC to develop political influence and sway other countries to adopt pro-
Russian foreign policy positions. MTC is the tool to incentivize African countries to 
participate in pro-Russian voting in international organizations or political alliances similar 
to the USSR’s sphere of influence in the 1980s. Signé and Pham are strong proponents of 
these arguments. Signé states that “recently, Russia has been using military assistance to 
gain influence in local politics … the aim of these techniques is to build strong relations 
with rulers or candidates for election so that when they come to power, they partner with 
Russia, ensuring Russia’s influence inside African countries.”30 Pham claims that Russia 
is utilizing “its arms sales and diplomatic support, often for rogue regimes, [aiming] at 
restoring its influence in Africa and assuring a ‘reserve’ of votes at the United Nations and 
other international forums.”31 
Russia MTC to Africa might also be motivated by Russia’s efforts to curb U.S. 
global influence, making western powers uncomfortable to discredit or embarrass the 
west.32 Such measures may leave the opportunity for Russia to pursue more strategic 
policies in Africa in the future, developing their sphere of influence among old Cold War 
allies, maintaining its symbolism as an anti-west super power for African countries which 
are limited in choices of international partners due to sanctions.33  
In addition, Putin’s foreign policies, especially in the eastern bloc countries, are 
driven by his interests in his own political survival and domestic political stability. Russia 
sees the West is in decline and because it views Russian civilization as superior, Russia 
believes that political dominance is inevitable. All of Russia’s past leads to emphasis on 
 
30 Signé, “Vladimir Putin Is Resetting Russia’s Africa Agenda to Counter the U.S. and China.” 
31 Pham, “Back to Africa,” 79. 
32 Isabelle Facon, Russias Quest for Influence Africa and the Middle East (France: Foundation pour la 
Recherche Stratégique, 2017), 20. 
33 Pham, “Back to Africa,” 80; Ross, “How Russia Moved Into Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
10 
military power and taking opportunities to show strength, which may explain the increase 
of MTC across Africa.34 Trenin sees Russian strength manifesting since “having left the 
Western orbit, Russia is also working to create its own solar system… It has started 
promoting Russian economic expansion in the [Commonwealth of Independent States] in 
an effort both to obtain lucrative assets and to enhance its political influence.”35 
Gopaldas also sees Putin-era MTC in Africa as motivated by political aspirations. 
Gopaldas quotes Stephanie Wolters of the Institute for Security Studies, who describes 
Russia’s strategy as “‘bargaining for African support in multilateral institutions in return 
for UN Security Council vetoes.’”36 As Golpaldas puts it: 
diplomatically, Africa is of strategic interest to Russia in terms of the 
geopolitical support it offers—African states comprise the biggest 
geographic voting bloc across a multitude of global diplomatic, security and 
economic institutions, most notably the UN Security Council. Thus African 
support is enticing for Russia as it hopes to assert its dominance and 
relevance on the world.37 
Golpaldas challenges the argument that Russian MTC is economically motivated 
by linking Russian economic investments to political goals, stating that, “two features of 
Russian investments are that most are state-led, and that investments are often linked with 
military and diplomatic interests”38 Finally, Facon associates Russia’s reemergence in 
Africa, specifically North Africa, with Russian efforts to counter regional extremism, 
which could bleed over to the Middle East, threatening Russia’s borders.39  
 
34 Anne Clunan, “The Soviet Break-Up, Russia’s Decline in the 1990s, and Its Re-Emergence as a 
Great Power under Putin” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2020). 
35 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (2006): 92, https://doi.org/
10.2307/20032043. 
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b. Economic Motivations 
Economic arguments that focus specifically on Russian MTC assert that Russia 
uses MTC primarily to develop partnerships with developing countries that it can use to 
advance its economic interests. The literature mainly mentions access to natural resources, 
access to trade markets generally, and access to the arms market specifically. In addition, 
MTC in Africa could be economically motivated to create opportunities for its state-owned 
enterprises to find export opportunities.40 Signé states, “Moscow is particularly known for 
its very specific model of arms first, business concessions later in many African countries 
and for its use of military assistance to get access to strategic economic sectors.”41 He 
specifically mentions Angolan energy and mining sector access to Russia in exchange for 
military assistance.  
The literature also puts forth that MTC to Africa was fueled by Russian desire for 
access to natural resources, specifically energy resources.42 Facon notes these efforts 
played out in 2006 during the Russo-Algerian arms sale, which was “made up of 
cooperation projects between Loukoil, Gazprom and Sonatrach.”43While this could have 
been beneficial for the country, these resources could also have been used to enrich the 
oligarchs personally, potentially in an effort to promote the perception of domestic 
stability. According to Marten, Russia is experiencing “low levels of innovation and 
growth [and] it faces the real possibility of a looming recession.”44 Facon argues that the 
mid-2000s were “characterized by an active promotion of [Russia’s] commercial interests 
(the ‘economisation’ of Russian foreign policy) alongside the implementation of an ‘energy 
 
40 Al Jazeera, “What’s Driving Russia’s Interest in Africa?,” Al Jazeera, July 13, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/07/driving-russia-interest-africa-
190710104009158.html. 
41 Signé, “Vladimir Putin Is Resetting Russia’s Africa Agenda to Counter the U.S. and China.” 
42 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa After the Cold War, 48; Facon, Russias Quest for Influence 
Africa and the Middle East, 13. 
43 Facon, Russias Quest for Influence Africa and the Middle East, 12. 
44 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?,” Washington Quarterly 
42, no. 4 (December 20, 2019): 157, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693105. 
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diplomacy.”45 Not only does this ensure Russian access to foreign energy industries, but 
it enables African and Middle Eastern countries to repay debts from the Cold War.  
Facon adds that the USSR hoped to capitalize partially or completely on Soviet debt 
relieved countries to expand Russian access to the market for goods generally as well as 
the market for Russian arms. The USSR hoped that, by relieving their debts, these African 
countries would one day become Russia’s economic partners.46 In the early 2000s, Russia 
hoped to use the “strengthening of the economy as a tool through which to conduct foreign 
policy as well as the reassertion of Russia’s regional influence through economic 
penetration.”47  
Finally, Pham also presents an additional economic argument stating that Russian 
MTC to Africa is motivated by gaining access to the arms market, stating that “not only do 
[arms] sales like these help extend Moscow’s influence in Africa, but they help the Russia 
arms industry at a time when sales to China, once the largest purchaser and now itself 
increasingly a significant supplier of weapons to Africa, are dropping off dramatically.”48 
A deep study of the combined economic and political motivations of Russian MTC 
are missing from the literature. More often than not, motivations are complicated and 
difficult to dissect. It is likely Russian motivations are both politically and economically 
motivated; however the available literature generally does not address the potential 
combined motivation for Russian MTC in Africa. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Like the existing literature, this thesis divides the motivations for Russian MTC in 
Africa into two broad categories: political and economic. The political hypothesis states 
that Russian MTC in Africa is motivated primarily by political, diplomatic, and strategic 
goals. These goals can include establishing or strengthening diplomatic ties, gaining 
 
45 Facon, Russias Quest for Influence Africa and the Middle East, 3–4. 
46 Facon, 11. 
47 Facon, 12. 
48 Pham, “Back to Africa,” 79. 
13 
support for its positions in international organizations like the United Nations (UN), 
acquiring military access, countering extremism, displacing the West, and satisfying the 
Putin regime’s domestic political clients.  
• H1: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill political goals 
• H1a: Russia engages in MTC to establish or strengthen diplomatic ties 
with African states 
• H1b: Russia engages in MTC to induce partner countries to support its 
positions in international institutions 
• H1c: Russia engages in MTC to gain military access to partner countries 
• H1d: Russia engages in MTC to counter extremism 
• H1e: Russia engages in MTC to displace/antagonize the West 
The analysis examines the political hypotheses using the following indicators. For 
H1a, it examines whether MTC deals preceded the establishment of diplomatic agreements 
or high-level official visits. It tests H1b by determining whether Russia’s MTC partners’ 
United Nations General Assembly votes are highly aligned with Russia’s. It tests H1c by 
examining whether new basing agreements or joint military exercises corresponded with 
Russian MTC deals. It evaluates H1d by determining whether Russian MTC deals 
supported counter extremism efforts. For H1e, it evaluates whether Russian MTC deals 
ignored U.S. sanctions or countered western involvement in each country. The more of 
these hypotheses that are supported, the stronger Russia’s political motivations for MTC. 
The economic hypothesis states that Russian MTC in Africa is motivated primarily 
by economic goals. MTC could advance Russia’s economic interests by increasing the 
market for Russian exports generally, increasing the market for Russian arms, creating 
opportunities for Russian state-owned enterprises (SOE) to invest in African industries, 
obtaining access to natural resources such as oil and gold, or enriching the regime’s 
domestic political clients.  
14 
• H2: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill economic goals  
• H2a: Russia engages in MTC to increase market for Russian exports 
generally 
• H2b: Russia engages in MTC to increase the market for Russian arms 
• H2c: Russia engages in MTC to create investment opportunities for 
Russian SOEs  
• H2d: Russia engages in MTC to obtain access to natural resources 
• H2e: Russia engages in MTC to economically satisfy the regime’s 
domestic political clients 
The analysis tests the economic hypotheses using the following economic 
indicators. It evaluates H2a by determining whether increases in MTC preceded increases 
of general Russian goods to the African country. For H2b, it examines whether arms sales 
to each country increased as MTC increased over time. It tests H2c by determining whether 
increasing SOE investment increased along with Russian MTC. It assesses H2d by 
identifying the natural resources in MTC recipient countries and determining if Russian 
MTC increases were linked to investments in natural resources. Finally, while H2e falls 
under primarily economic motivations, this hypothesis covers the gap between the 
economic and political motivations by creating investment opportunities to satisfy 
oligarchs which in turn provide support for the Russian regime. It tests H1e by identifying 
the Russian actors that benefit from MTC deals. The more of these hypotheses that are 
supported, the stronger Russia’s economic motivations for MTC. 
If a country exhibits predominantly political indictors, the political hypothesis will 
be supported. Conversely, if it exhibits more economic indicators, the economic hypothesis 
will be supported. In the event that a country displays an equal number and weight of 
indicators, the country’s results would either demonstrate that both factors are equally at 
play, or that there is another primary explanation to the motivation of Russian MTC in the 
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country. The analysis also determines which political and economic incentives play 
dominant motivational roles in Russian MTC.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes a comparative case study model utilizing John Stuart Mill’s 
“method of agreement” model in order to determine whether Russian motivations for MTC 
are similar across widely differing countries. By using this approach, the research design 
indicates whether Russia’s motives are consistent, instead of related to a common link 
among cases, such as being colonized by the same colonizer or having the same form of 
government. While there is concerted effort to select different countries, the method of 
selection is not perfect and there are undoubtedly similarities across the countries. The two 
countries I study are Sudan and Algeria. These countries were selected based on their 
varying levels of political stability, levels of economic development, relationships with 
Russia, and relationships with the United States. In addition, they were both selected 
because Sudan and Algeria are major recipients of Russian MTC. 
Sudan is the first case study because it has a long history with both Russia and the 
United States; however, is currently trying to find its place in the world with the secession 
of South Sudan. Sudan’s economy was oil dependent until 2011, when South Sudan 
seceded. Since then, it has been trying to diversify and strengthen other economic sectors. 
In 2019, the country experienced a military coup and a transitional government currently 
sits in power. Sudan was colonized by the British and therefore has a different colonial 
history and experience than Algeria. Geographically, Sudan is considered to be in east 
Africa, rather than northern Africa.  
The second case study is Algeria, a North African country colonized and settled by 
the French. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
Algeria receives the largest amount of Russian arms of any African country, receiving an 
average of $826 million between 2014 and 2019.49 The next highest importer of Russian 
 
49 “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI, accessed May 23, 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/
armstrade/page/values.php. 
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arms is Angola, at $200 million between 2014–2019.50 Algeria recently had a power 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a presidential republic regime in 2019, with the 
election of the new prime minister in April.51  
Each case study briefly addresses Russia’s relationship with the country during the 
Cold War and Yeltsin Era. It identifies what Russia’s MTC consists of today, such as 
security cooperation deals, arms sale, contractor support, Private Military Companies 
(PMCs), military advisors, and military training and exercises. I then test each 
hypothesized motivation for Russian MTC in Africa. Data for this analysis comes from 
news articles, official statements, academic and think tank papers, and databases, including 
SIPRI. These sources provide the best information for this thesis, without being able to 
directly ask Russian MTC official about its motivations. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters, with each case study having its own dedicated 
chapter. The first chapter provides the background and preliminary information for the 
reader to understand the history of Russian MTC in Africa. It also provides a brief 
explanation as to what MTC means in order to give the reader context for the sources and 
research design used in the thesis. 
I dedicate a chapter to each case study to break down the relationship and history 
of each country in respect to Russian MTC involvement. Because the cases are all different, 
it is quite possible the outcomes may be different, indicating different Russian MTC 
motivations in each country. Each chapter provides a brief history of Russian MTC in the 
country. It then describe what MTC is currently being done in that country and how MTC 
changed since the Cold War and Yeltsin era. I then evaluate the strength of the political or 
economic indicators within each country. Based on the indicators, I analyze why Russia is 
providing MTC in the way it is in each country by explaining significance of each 
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indicators. Finally, I conclude with my determination of whether political or economic 
motives can explain the pattern of MTC in that country.  
The last chapter summarizes the findings and provides a comparison of findings 
across the cases to determine if there is one explanation that can explain the motivation of 
Russian MTC across the three countries. This provides the opportunity to differentiate the 
motives in each country by comparing political and economic motivations. Once a motive 
has been determined for each country, I determine what pattern follow through the two 
cases. Based on the findings, I suggest future research projects and conclude with proposed 
policy implications for the United States, specifically toward their strategic goals in 
AFRICOM with the impending draw down.  
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II. SUDAN 
Sudan provides a context in which to understand the motivations of Russian MTC. In 
this chapter, I show that the only supported primary motivation of Russian MTC to Sudan 
from 2000 to 2018 was to satisfy the economic needs of the regime’s domestic political 
clients. There are several motivations with a mixed outcome, but evidence in these cases are 
lacking. The mixed outcome motivations are primarily political motivations to include 
inducing partner countries to support Russia’s positions in international institutions, to gain 
military access to Sudan, and to displace/antagonize the West. Finally, the chapter concludes 
that Russian motivations for MTC in Sudan are primarily economic, focusing on supporting 
Russian oligarchs and therefore Putin’s hold on power. 
The first part of this chapter provides a brief history of domestic issues in Sudan from 
the Cold War-era to 2018, followed by a summary of Russia MTC in Sudan from 2000 to 
2018. The second section demonstrates how Russian MTC to Sudan evolved over time, such 
that, after the Cold War, it included arms, PMCs, military agreements, and diplomatic visits. 
The third section evaluates the indicators of political and economic motivations of Russian 
MTC, showing that Russia’s primary motivations for MTC in Sudan are economic in nature, 
which in turn supports Putin’s political goal of maintaining power.  
A. SUDAN DOMESTIC BACKGROUND  
Russia’s MTC in Sudan must be understood in relation to political tension within 
Sudan. This context is important to understand the potential opportunities for Russian MTC 
in Sudan because it shows Sudan’s prior relationship with Russia and how Russia uses the 
relationship to develop Russian MTC in Sudan. This first section addresses the internal 
turmoil which sets the stage for Russian MTC in Sudan. Between 1983–2005, Sudan 
experienced its Second Civil War, which was fought between the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army and the government. Approximately 1–2 million civilians died, mostly from drought 
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and starvation.52 In addition, approximately 4 million South Sudanese were displaced from 
their homes.53 In 1989, Omar al-Bashir had led a successful coup and became ruler of Sudan 
which began Sudan’s economic turbulence, challenging Bashir’s regime and paving the way 
for Russian MTC support.54 A ceasefire occurred in 2005, but it wasn’t until 2011 that South 
Sudan won its independence in a referendum vote. In addition, while the civil war occurred, 
Sudan experienced a genocide in Darfur where non-Arab Sudanese were systematically killed 
by the government from 2003–2005.55 As these conflicts continued, Bashir tightened his hold 
on power. 
Bashir sustained his grip on power, during and after the war, through a neopatrimonial 
system which allowed him to stay in power for thirty years. Bashir utilized government 
resources and positions to buy off elites, which in turn resulted in inefficient and ineffective 
governmental systems.56 South Sudan’s secession threatened this system by causing Sudan 
to lose 70% of its oil revenue when South Sudan divested its oil production from Sudan. As 
time passed however, Bashir “prioritized buying the loyalty of the security apparatus over 
sustaining patronage to the ruling party and the urban population” due to Bashir’s rents 
decreasing from the loss of oil revenue after the secession of South Sudan and its oil.57 
Sudan’s fiscal deficit widened after South Sudan’s secession, which forced Bashir to use 
coercive measures and double down on fiscal austerity. What resulted was Sudan’s current 
economic predicament: high inflation, high levels of debt and corruption, and limited 
international investment.58  
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In an effort to fill the gap left by Sudan’s diminished oil resources caused by the 
secession of South Sudan, Sudan recently exploited its gold boom and aims to diversify its 
economy through a new vein of liberalization, replacing oil with gold as Sudan’s “single 
largest source of export earnings.”59 In the absence of Sudan’s old oil fields, and in order to 
pay back loans, Bashir chose to develop gold to develop a resource that would provide large 
revenues quickly. But the gold was mostly smuggled outside of the country for Bashir’s 
personal gain. Ironically, the gold revenue did little to sustain his patronage networks and 
Sudan continued to have difficulty in paying down its various debts. 
By 2013, however, these methods were no longer working. Bashir cracked down on 
an Arab Spring protest which left over 100 civilians dead.60 Another crackdown against the 
December 2018 anti-austerity protests led to the arrest of over 1,000 protestors.61 Bashir 
relied on the loyalty of the security apparatus purchased by his client-patron system to control 
the population. 
In order to combat the growing economic problems, in 2019, Bashir’s government 
“imposed emergency austerity measures to try to stave off economic collapse. Cuts to bread 
and fuel subsidies sparked demonstrations in the east over living standards and the anger 
spread to the capital, Khartoum.”62 This social instability in conjunction with Bashir’s 
inability to pay both the elites and his security apparatus led to the coup that ousted Bashir in 
December 2019. These events were a few of the many challenges presented for Sudan in 
redefining its international partnerships and domestic policies.  
Sudan continued to work on establishing its international partnership and 
strengthening its domestic policies through the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the 
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military junta that took control after the overthrow of Bashir. Today, the Civilian Led 
Transitional Government (CLTG) must reconcile relationships and legacies from the Cold 
War and Bashir agreements to the CLTG model of rule.  
B. RUSSIA AND SUDAN: AN EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP 
During the Cold War, Sudan alternated between alignment with the USSR and with 
the United States. From 1956 to 1976, Sudan was a partner with the USSR. The USSR and 
Sudan established diplomatic relations in 1956. Bilateral ties remained stable throughout 1969 
after Jaafar Nimeiri’s 1969 coup, as Sudan looked to expand trade with the USSR and eastern 
bloc. The Sudanese-Russian relationship continued with other leaders, such as Former Prime 
Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub (1968-71) who accepted MTC and economic aid from 
the USSR during his tenure.63 According to Global Security, “by 1970 it was estimated that 
there were 2,000 Soviet and Eastern European technical advisers in the country.”64 About 
350 Sudanese received military training.65 In 1971, political unrest against then President 
Nimeiri led to the deterioration of USSR-Sudanese relations.66 
In 1976, Nimeiri expelled his Soviet advisors due to rising concerns over the USSR’s 
expanding influence in the Horn of Africa and Soviet aligned Libyan ruler Muammar al-
Qaddafi’s plays toward Sudan as the Sudanese economic situation became more unstable.67 
Nimeiri’s growing worry opened the way to improve Sudanese-American relations.68 From 
1976–1989, Sudan was an important American client. Sudan received more U.S. aid 
throughout the Carter and Reagan administrations than any other country in sub-Saharan 
Africa.69 Schmidt remarks on the shift of relationship from Soviet to American allyship 
 
63  “Soviet Union and Sudan,” Global Security, accessed October 4, 2020, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sudan/forrel-su.htm. 
64 Global Security. 
65 Global Security. 
66 Global Security. 
67 Foreign Intervention in Africa After the Cold War, 105. 
68 Schmidt, 105. 
69 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 205. 
23 
during the Cold War, stating: “Sudan, like Somalia, was first a Soviet and then a U.S. ally. 
However, Sudan was never a Western proxy.”70  
American aid to Sudan ended in 1989 after a military coup overturned the elected 
government, bringing the National Islamist Front and General Omar al-Bashir to power. After 
Bashir came into power, relations between the United States and Sudan shifted as Bashir saw 
the United States as meddling in its internal affairs by instigating conflict within Sudan.71 
This caused American and Sudanese interests to become strained and created a shift from 
American partnership back to Russian partnership. In 1993, Bashir was appointed president. 
In 1993, the United States designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism for providing 
sanctuary and assistance to Islamic terrorist groups.72 The United States imposed financial 
sanctions and an arms embargo that plagued Sudanese political partnerships and economic 
development.73 
As the Darfur crisis emerged in 2004, Bashir started to develop closer ties with Russia. 
Russia was an appealing ally to Sudan because “the Soviet planned-economy model offered 
an alternative to Western post-colonial capitalist competition, with a pathway out of poverty 
to quick industrialization through state intervention.”74 Russia strengthened these ties, even 
though it was heavily criticized for providing Sudan with arms after the UN Security Council 
placed an arms embargo on Sudan in 2005. Amnesty International accused Russia of 
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knowingly supplying arms, which would be used against Sudanese in Darfur.75 Russia also 
pushed back on a 2012 UN. resolution proposing economic sanctions against Sudan.76 
As the Russo-Sudanese relationship progressed, Russia became Bashir’s main partner 
to counter what he perceived as American interference. Bashir claimed the secession of South 
Sudan was related to U.S. policies and that the United States aimed to split Sudan into five 
countries.77 He believed Sudan faced “major pressure and conspiracy from the United States” 
calling on Russia for protection from the United States.78 Bashir offered Sudan as “‘Russia’s 
key to Africa.’ What he wanted in return was ‘protection from aggressive U.S. actions’ in the 
region.”79 Putin’s reelection in 2017 created an opportunity to develop a closer strategic 
partnership with Sudan while undermining American progress. For example, Putin invited 
Bashir to Moscow as soon as President Trump lifted many of the economic sanctions imposed 
20 years earlier.80 In 2019, Russia advocated for noninterference in Sudan, countering 
Security Council suggestions to become involved in Sudanese domestic affairs.81 Russia 
actively supported blocking a UN statement on the 2019 Bashir coup.82  
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C. POST-COLD WAR RUSSIAN MTC IN SUDAN  
Russian involvement in Sudan has been expansive, extending to political, diplomatic, 
and economic measures. Russian MTC in Sudan from 2000–2018 included arms sales, 
deployment of PMCs, military agreements, and diplomatic visits. MTC overall increased 
towards the end of Bashir’s regime, which Bashir used to maintain power. This includes the 
deployment of PMCs as well as an increase of diplomatic visits. As of 2018, Russia MTC 
decreased in conjunction with the fall of the Bashir regime, but Russia is still invested in the 
country.  
1. Arms 
A major source of Russian MTC to Sudan during the post-Cold War period has been 
arms sale. In 2001, Sudan purchased ten MiG-28SE fighters and two MiG-29UB dual-seat 
trainers from Russia—an agreement totaling $120 million.83 Russian arms sale to Sudan 
spiked in 2004 at the peak of the Darfur crisis. As seen in Figure 1, Russian arms sales to 
Sudan shot up during the war in Darfur, which lasted from 2003–2009, only to quickly 
decrease as the first civil war and war in Darfur and came to an end in 2005 and 2009 
respectively. Over the next three years, arms sales flattened out. The years 2010 and 2011 had 
a small increase of Russian arms to Sudan, followed by two years of unavailable data, between 
2013 and 2014. These years were marked by political instability and regime crackdowns, 
which may explain why reporting on arms shipments is lacking. Finally, Russian arms to 
Sudan declined, hitting zero in 2018. 
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Figure 1. Russian Arms Sales to Sudan84 
According to SIPRI, Sudan was one of four African countries that are included on the 
international top 50 arms importer list of all arms between 2000–2018.85 While data is 
unavailable for 2013 and 2014, Russian arms sales to Sudan averaged 37.6 million between 
2006 and 2018. These figures indicate that Sudan was not a very important market for Russian 
arms sales. However, Russia has been able to corner the arms market in Sudan.86 One analyst 
observes that, “In 2017, about half of Sudan’s arms purchases were Russia-sourced.”87 The 
rest of the arms comes from China, Iran, Belarus, and Ukraine; however Russia is Sudan’s 
top arms supplier from 2000–2019.88 Russia continued to supply arms to the Bashir regime 
until the president’s hold on power became unstable in late 2018. Russia was counting on 
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Bashir’s success and was willing to provide him with the arms, such as the Su-35, and 
protection.89  
Table 1 depicts SIPRI’s list of major weapons transfers, deals with deliveries, and 
orders made from 2000 to 2018 from Russia to Sudan.90 It shows that the majority of transfers 
to Sudan were transport helicopters. The helicopters were mostly acquired around time of the 
Darfur crisis and throughout the second civil war. 
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2. Private Military Contractors 
In addition to arms deals, Russia has also provided Private Military Company 
(PMC) support to Sudan. The Wagner group, the most infamous Russian PMC, has 
frequently been used as a security tool abroad.93 The presence of Russian PMCs in Sudan 
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was first publicly noted in 2017. These reports observed that approximately 100–200 PMCs 
were deployed to Sudan to “train local forces, protect mining sites, and guard government 
officials” as well as aid the government in training the military.94 While there was no direct 
evidence PMSs were in Sudan prior to 2017, the PMC mission of training forces and 
protecting mining sites makes it possible PMCs were in Sudan before 2017 in a discreet 
advisory role. What is evident however, is that in 2018, the PMC Wagner Group was sent 
to Sudan to assist former president Omar al-Bashir in maintaining his regime: a form of 
support that Russia increasingly provides to other countries. Although Wagner does fight 
for money on contracts and is often called a mercenary group, it is also “fiercely patriotic. 
It works only in situations where it believes it is acting on behalf of the Russia state.”95 
According to Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, 
Russia private security companies are “limited to training staff for the military and law 
enforcement agencies of the Republic of Sudan.”96 But much western media disagrees 
with this statement, noting that “after mass protests erupted in Sudan in December 2018, 
Russia had openly supported embattled Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s efforts to 
retain power, and Russian private military contractor’s (PMCs) were deployed to train 
Sudan’s army” to aid in that goal.97 Bashir was pleased with the PMC support and “praised 
Russian-Sudanese military cooperation during a July 2018 meeting with Putin in the 
Kremlin.”98 
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Russia hopes to maintain their PMC presence in Sudan with the Transitional 
Military Council (TMC), the military junta government that took power after the Sudanese 
coup d’état in April 2019, solidifying their influence over Sudan’s transition process.99  
3. Military Agreements 
While Sudan and Russia do not have a formal military alliance, the two countries 
have established several military agreements. Information on these military agreements is 
limited; however several news outlets and think tanks have reported that the CLTG 
continue to uphold these agreements, despite the majority being agreed upon during 
Bashir’s regime.  
In 2019, the Sudanese parliament and Russian government signed a draft military 
agreement which, “would pave the road for the latter to build a military base on the Red 
Sea coast in the future,” further tying the future of Sudan to Russian interests.100 The 2019 
agreement also provides access for Russia’s warships to Sudanese ports.101 The military 
agreement aims “to develop military cooperation between Sudan and Russia in accordance 
with their respective laws, principles and rules of international law, and international 
treaties.”102 According to the agreement, Sudan and Russia:  
will exchange views and information on military and political issues, and 
matters of mutual importance and international security… will develop 
relations in the field of joint military training, engineering training, military 
education, military medicine, military history, military terrain, military 
hydrography, sports and culture. Russia and Sudan will also share their 
experience in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United 
Nations, as well as their experience in search and rescue activities at sea.103 
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In 2019, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, Adbel Fattah 
Abdelragman al-Burhan, asserted that he aims to “implement all military defence 
agreements signed between the two countries. The deals include part of the reform of the 
Sudanese military establishment and enhancement of the capabilities of the Sudan Armed 
Forces.”104 Since Sudanese defense, mining, and energy sectors were already expanding 
in Sudan, the TMC continued honoring the Russian contracts established during Bashir’s 
regime.105 However, it is unclear whether the new government will actually allow Russia 
to build a base in Sudan.106  
4. Diplomatic Visits 
Russia has an embassy and Consular section in Khartoum and the two countries 
have substantial diplomatic interactions. Diplomatic visits demonstrate the progression and 
solidification of interstate relationships, and while they are not as tangible as arms, training, 
or military agreements, they demonstrate the strength of an MTC relationship between two 
countries. The increase of visits over time, and their alignment with the aforementioned 
more tangible forms of MTC, suggest that MTC increased the political relationship 
between Sudan and Russia. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
between 2015 and his removal from office, Omar al-Bashir visited Moscow more times 
than any other African head of state, visiting Moscow in 2015, 2017, and 2018.107 
According to Military Watch Magazine, the 2017 meeting was significant because the 
result of that meeting brought the Su-35’s to Khartoum.108 Of note, Putin never visited 
Khartoum while he was in office. Although he accepted an invitation to Khartoum in 2018, 
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Bashir was ousted by 2019 and the visit never took place.109 Before 2015, neither Russian 
nor Sudanese leaders visited each other’s capitals.  
During a meeting between Putin and the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of 
Sudan Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan in Russia in October 2019, al-Burhan thanked 
Russia for supporting and standing by Sudan.110 He remarked that Russia stands with 
countries to fight for their rights and for justice, alluding to the importance of armed forces 
and coalition forces in building Sudan’s future.111 Al-Burhan concluded with an 
encouraging message to Russia, stating “we hope that we will sign new documents and 
cooperation agreements, and you will help us, in particular, to build up our armed 
forces.”112 
D. EXPLAINING RUSSIAN MTC IN SUDAN 
The relationship between Sudan and Russia is influenced by many political and 
economic factors. The following analysis demonstrates that the primary motivation for 
Russian MTC in Sudan is the economic satisfaction of Russian oligarchs, which ultimately 
boosts Putin’s political strength. Russia’s resurgence of MTC in Sudan since 2000 
demonstrates its desire to maintain Putin’s political strength by providing oligarchs 
economic access to the region. There is little evidence that Russian MTC is motivated by 
primarily political motivations between 2000 to 2018, although some individual political 
hypotheses have mixed results but cannot conclusively be supported.  
1. Political Explanations  
Russian MTC to Sudan is not strongly motivated by political motivations. There is 
potential that Russian MTC induces Sudan to support the Russian position in the UN, gain 
access military access, and antagonize the west, but the evidence is limited. Therefore, with 
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the evidence available, it is difficult to determine if Russian MTC in Sudan was definitively 
motivated by any political explanations from 2000–2018. This demonstrates that Russian 
involvement and MTC to Sudan might be political motivated, but based on the available 
evidence the political motivations cannot be directly linked to Russian MTC in Sudan. 
Even without a clear linkage, Russia utilized Bashir’s need for MTC to develop a greater 
footprint in Sudan when the opportunity presented itself.  
Table 2. Political Motivations in Sudan 
H1: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill political goals Finding for Sudan 
(Y/N) 
H1a: Russia engages in MTC to establish or strengthen diplomatic 
ties with African states 
N 
H1b: Russia engages in MTC to induce partner countries to support 
its positions in international institutions 
Mixed 
H1c: Russia engages in MTC to gain military access to partner 
countries 
Mixed 
H1d: Russia engages in MTC to counter extremism N 
H1e: Russia engages in MTC to displace/antagonize the West Mixed 
 
a. H1a: Russia engages in MTC to establish or strengthen diplomatic ties 
with African States 
Russian MTC has generally not effectively strengthened diplomatic ties with 
Sudan, because Russian MTC did not lead to substantial diplomatic agreements between 
the two countries. It took almost two decades for Russia to arrange a visit to Khartoum, 
whereas Russian heads of states visited Algeria nine times between 2000–2018. Instead, 
Bashir visited Moscow a total of three times, in 2015, 2017, and 2018.113 In addition, 
Russian arms to Sudan stayed low despite the increase in diplomatic visits to Moscow 
(Figure 1). It could be argued that Putin’s planned visit indicated growing diplomatic ties; 
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however, since Bashir was ousted before Putin could conduct his visit, it is impossible to 
know what diplomatic outcomes would have occurred.  
Economic and security agreements can strengthen diplomatic ties between 
countries, and while Sudan and Russia signed several security agreements, there is a lack 
of information on the details of these agreements. In addition to these security agreements, 
Russia and Sudan agreed upon several economic agreements which will be maintained by 
the CLTG. But again, these agreements are always mentioned in a general way in the 
media. The lack of press on these agreements and lack of major agreements suggests that 
the diplomatic ties are not as important to Russia as other factors.  
Some researchers argue that Russia also has larger geopolitical goals in Sudan and 
Africa writ-large. While Russian MTC to Sudan may not result in diplomatic ties, in the 
case of Sudan, it might create a political sphere of influence to be a great power competitor. 
Samuel Ramani from The Middle East Institute proposed that after “a military-brokered 
transition in Sudan, [Russia] hope[d] to strengthen its person-to-person links with the 
Sudanese military to ensure that it can compete with China for long-term geopolitical 
influence.”114 In addition, the Jamestown Foundation claims that “Russia’s new 
engagement with Sudan is an expression of Russia’s new confidence and apparent 
eagerness to pursue an aggressive and exclusive foreign policy.”115 Developing these 
connections between Sudan and Russia potentially aid Russia’s ability to compete in global 
power competition with the west and China. Based on the available evidence, this 
hypothesis is not supported because the efforts to develop ties were instigated by Bashir, 
instead of by Russian MTC. There is also a lack of concrete security agreements available 
for public viewing, which indicates the agreements might not be as binding as other 
security agreements Russia makes. Finally, while the sphere of influence describes 
Russia’s growing interest and potential presence in Sudan, the available evidence does not 
tie the growing geopolitical goes in Sudan to Russian MTC.  
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b. H1b: Russia engages in MTC to induce partner countries to support its 
positions in international institutions 
It is difficult to determine whether Russian MTC to Sudan is motivated by gaining 
Sudanese support in international institutions, but based on available information, it seems 
unlikely. Sudan is part of the African UN voting bloc. Sudan’s UN voting patterns align in 
Russia’s favor 68% of the time, compared to the 15% in agreement with the United States 
from 1999 to 2019.116 However, this pattern stayed consistent from Cold War era to post-
Cold War era, as Sudan’s voting pattern aligned with Russia 69% of the time from 1980 to 
1999, when Sudan was a closer partner with the United States.117  
While the voting patterns did not change across time, as Russian MTC to Sudan 
increased, Sudan was one of only eleven countries in the UN General Assembly to vote 
against the resolutions declaring Crimea’s split from the Ukraine as invalid in 2014. However, 
it does not appear that this vote was associated with an increase in Russian arms sales. 
Although data are unavailable for 2014, the level of arms transfers in 2015 was similar to 
2012, the last previously reported year. It therefore seems unlikely that Sudan’s support on 
the vote was linked to Russian MTC. Sudan’s vote in this matter is unsurprising, but it should 
be noted that other African countries with similar voting records, such as Sudan, chose to 
abstain from the vote.118 Even though Sudan voted against the Crimea resolution there was 
no visible corresponding MTC support. Arms transfers remained consistent during this period 
of time and private military companies did not show up in Sudan until 2017. Therefore, with 
the evidence available at this time, it seems unlikely that Russian MTC is used to induce 
Sudan to support Russian positions in the UN. 
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c. H1c: Russia engages in MTC to gain military access to partner countries 
It is unlikely that Russia engages in MTC with Sudan to gain military access to Sudan. 
While Russia has expressed interest in the eastern coast of Africa and attempted to secure 
either a base in eastern Africa or obtain port rights, Russia does not seem to demonstrate strong 
commitment to establishing a base in Sudan, specifically.119 Instead, it seeks a base in eastern 
Africa, generally. A base would be beneficial to Russia for trade and to participate further in 
great power competition since the United State and China already have their own bases in 
East Africa. For example, Russia used Djiboutian bases as part of their UN anti-piracy effort. 
Russian presence in Djibouti was temporary, but Russia aspired to make the temporary 
maritime presence in East Africa permanent by establishing basing agreements in Eastern 
Africa. After Djibouti rejected its request in 2016, Russia expressed interest in a basing 
agreement with Sudan.120 According to the Sudan Tribune, in 2017, during a visit to Russia, 
Bashir responded by offering “to construct an airbase for Russia on the red sea and to re-equip 
the Sudanese army with the Russian weapons including SU-30 fighter jets and surface-to-air-
missiles.”121 But no agreements have come out of those talks and Russia does not have any 
basing rights or agreements in Sudan, suggesting that Russian MTC is not motivated by 
gaining military access in Sudan—or at least has not been successful in achieving that goal.  
d. H1d: Russia engages in MTC to counter extremism 
Russia is not a primary partner in Sudan to counter extremism and does not exhibit 
concerns about extremism in Sudan. Instead, Russia deepened MTC ties with Sudan after the 
United States removed sanctions, when extremism was less of a threat. Historically, Russia’s 
MTC aligned primarily with Sudan’s civil wars, not increases in terrorism. Sudan was 
designated by the United States “as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993 for supporting 
international terrorist groups including the Abu Nidal Organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, 
 
119 McGregor, “Will Khartoum’s Appeal to Putin for Arms and Protection Bring Russian Naval Bases to 
the Red Sea?” 
120 Martin Plaut, “Russia Moves in on Sudan and Keen for Base in Eritrea,” Eritrea Focus, August 14, 
2019, https://eritrea-focus.org/russia-moves-in-on-sudan-and-keen-for-base-in-eritrea/. 
121 Sudan Tribune, “Sudan Says Russia Could Set up Military Base on Red Sea.” 
37 
Hamas, and Hizballah.”122 However, terrorist attacks did not spike until 2014, 2015, and 
2016.123 Also, there is no evidence that Russian MTC went towards countering extremism in 
Sudan. Instead, Sudan partnered with the United States to combat extremism in an effort to 
get sanctions reduced and off the SST list. It is therefore unlikely that Russia is concerned 
about the threat of extremism in Sudan.  
e. H1e: Russia engages in MTC to displace/antagonize the West 
Antagonizing or displacing the west is not a primary motivator of Russian MTC to 
Sudan.124 At most, Russia counters western values and supports Sudan’s authoritarian 
regime; however this is not specific to Russian MTC. The Russian government supported the 
UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan during the Darfur crisis, at the same time that Russian 
arms transfers to Sudan experienced a high spike. In 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation made a second statement stating that Russia was ready to participate 
in peacekeeping operations in Sudan. These statements show that Russia was not trying to 
antagonize the West during this time.  
In 2007, Amnesty International accused Russia, along with China, of supplying arms 
to Sudan that were ultimately used in the war in Darfur.125 The supplying of arms while the 
United States had imposed sanctions is potential support for Russian MTC antagonizing the 
west. The Russian government denied these claims however, stating anything sold to Sudan 
fell within the sanction limitations. In addition, Russian arms to Sudan decreased after western 
sanctions were alleviated in 2017 (Figure 1). The alleviation of sanctions could have provided 
Russia an opportunity to displace the West; instead arms sales dropped to zero in 2018, further 
demonstrating the lack of ties between Russian MTC and displacing the West.  
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Instead, it is more likely that Sudan wanted to displace the West by increasing its 
relationship with Russia. This may have surprised Western countries, since the United States 
anticipated an increase in U.S.–Sudanese relations after the sanctions were lifted. Instead, 
Bashir criticized the United States over concerns of encroachment on Sudanese sovereignty. 
Russia’s foreign policy presents itself as an alternative to western democracy, which is 
appealing to countries such as Sudan. Bashir’s statements against the United States indicated 
that, despite the alleviation of U.S. sanctions against Sudan in 2017, Bashir’s preferred Russia. 
And Russia was aware that “the Khartoum regime [was] looking for allies especially ones 
with a presence of the UN Security Council.”126 Russia therefore seized the opportunity to 
strengthen relations with Sudan. However, Russia was not actively displacing the United 
States, since U.S. engagement in Sudan is minimal..  
f. Conclusion of Political Motivations 
Overall, the political motivations for Russian MTC in Sudan are weak. Russian MTC 
is not used to strengthen diplomatic ties or counter extremism in Sudan. There is a possibility 
that Russian MTC is motivated by gaining support in the UN, gaining military access in 
Sudan, or by antagonizing the West, however there is not enough evidence to prove that these 
outcomes are motivated by Russian MTC. What can be said is that Russia’s footprint in Sudan 
grew, but whether or not this was to support specific political goals is yet to be determined 
with the evidence available at this time.  
2. Economic Explanations 
In Sudan, Russia provides MTC to satisfy the Putin regime’s domestic political 
clients. This enables Russian oligarchs to utilize Sudan to promote their personal interests. 
While these efforts do not create grand economic gains for Russia as a whole, it satisfies 
Putin’s supporters, adding to his domestic strength. This economic motivation touches upon 
an explanation of Russian MTC that is largely missing from the literature, that of economic 
motivations to achieve domestic political goals.  
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Table 3. Economic Motivations in Sudan 
H2: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill economic goals  Presence in 
Sudan (Y/N) 
H2a: Russia engages in MTC to increase market for Russian exports generally N 
H2b: Russia engages in MTC to increase the market for Russian arms N 
H2c: Russia engages in MTC to create investment opportunities for Russian 
SOEs 
N 
H2d: Russia engages in MTC to obtain access to natural resources N 




a. H2a: Russia engages in MTC to increase market for Russian exports 
generally 
Since 2000, Russian exports to Sudan increased by approximately 7500%. Imports 
from Russia started at less than $10M in 2000 and increased to over $500M by 2018. But 
while the amount of Russian exports to Sudan generally increased between 2000–2018, it is 
hard to determine whether or not Russian MTC led to that increase. First, the beginning of the 
increase of Russian exports to Sudan aligned with the bump in arms sales in 2004. However, 
the increase in trade was quite small, relative to the increase in arms transfers. Second, as 
diplomatic visits to Russia increased in number, with three happening between 2015, and 
2018, Sudan experienced an increase of general exports to Sudan. In fact, general exports 
increased from 2016 to 2018, in around the same time as Bashir’s visits to Moscow. However, 
the general increases of exports to Sudan increased as Bashir’s regime became more unstable 
and predominantly consisted of agriculture products such as wheat, which the regime needed 
to feed the population, as bread prices rose exponentially due to the country’s economic crisis. 
Also, other bumps in Russian exports did not correspond to increased arms transfers. 
Consequently, while there is some correlation, it is difficult to determine whether MTC 
contributed significantly to these outcomes, or if there were other factors at play that led to 
the overall increase of Russian exports to Sudan.  
As seen in Figure 1, the peaks of general Russian exports to Sudan align more closely 
to Sudanese regime instability and therefore an increased need for appeasing the population 
or needing supplies during a time of instability. 2004, 2013, and 2018 were all years of 
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political instability and internal conflict within Sudan. Figure 2 shows that the peaks of general 
exports to Sudan occurring in 2004 to 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2014 and 2016–18. At the same 
time, inflation ran high, therefore the demand for agriculture products in Sudan was there, and 
continued to grow through 2018. Finally, the increase from 2015 to 2018 could be explained 
by a combination of support to Bashir during regime stability in addition to the alleviation of 
economic sanctions, opening the market up. While each of these individual peaks might have 
had different motivations, it is more likely that increases in were associated with maintaining 
regime stability than with an increase of MTC. 
 
Figure 2. General Russian Exports to Sudan from 2000–2018127 
b. H2b: Russia engages in MTC to increase the market for Russian arms 
Russia does not primarily engage in MTC with Sudan to increase the market for 
Russian arms to Sudan because the market for Russian arms has stayed low. According to 
Figure 1, Russian arms to Sudan decreased after 2004 and consistently stayed at lower levels 
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compared to the peak of arms deals during the Darfur crisis. In addition, the increase of 
protests and local instability, which brought Wagner to Sudan, did not demonstrate an increase 
of Russian arms to the country. Sudan has not been a significant market for Russia arms sales 
for the duration of the their MTC relationship. Therefore, the increasing the market for 
Russian arms in Sudan is not a primary motivation for Russian MTC in Sudan. 
c. H2c: Russia engages in MTC to create investment opportunities for Russian 
SOEs 
Russia does not engage in MTC to create investment opportunities for Russian SOEs 
because Russian SOEs have not yet become very involved in Sudanese investments. Instead, 
private Russian companies, such as Wagner or M Invest, are more active in Sudan than SOEs. 
Russian SOEs have tried to invest in Sudan’s oil industry with limited success. Oil SOEs such 
as Rosneft and Gazprom have expressed interested in exploratory programs in Sudan; 
however these have not gone very far. For example, Slavneft signed “a $126 million 
production-sharing agreement with Sudan for oil exploration” with Sudan in 2002,128 but the 
deal ultimately fell through.129 In contrast to Chinese SOEs, which have been the dominant 
actors in Sudan’s oil industry, Russian SOEs are not very involved. This is partly because of 
the secession of South Sudan. Since the secession, Russia has attempted to expand into South 
Sudan oil production, hoping to take advantage of Red Sea port access to facilitate access to 
oilfields in South Sudan.130  
Some of the Russian interest in Sudan therefore comes from the South Sudanese oil 
that flows through Sudan’s infrastructure. Russia also “expressed interest in constructing an 
oil refinery in Sudan to increase the profitability of its oil exploration deals in South 
Sudan,”131 with the potential production capacity of 200,000 barrels per day.132 Also, in 
2018, around the time of two of Bashir’s visits to Moscow, Sudan and Russia signed a natural 
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gas exploration deal in the Red Sea around eastern Sudan.133 Overall, however, Russia has 
not moved very far in SOE investment in Sudan, so this hypothesis can be rejected. 
d. H2d: Russia engages in MTC to obtain access to natural resources 
It is unlikely that Russia’s MTC engagement in Sudan is motivated by obtaining direct 
access to natural resources. Toward the end of his regime, Bashir’s regime stability relied on 
“increased economic and security cooperation with Russia, receiving military assistance and 
offering agreements spanning some of Sudan’s most lucrative sectors such as oil, natural gas, 
agriculture, and gold.”134 However is most likely explained by Bashir’s desire to gain Russian 
assistance verses Russia wanting access to Sudanese natural resources. Sudan’s primary 
export used to be petroleum and Russia has access to its own vast oil gas reserves. Russian 
investment in its other major natural resource, gold, is likely tied to satisfying domestic 
political clients (H2e), rather than obtaining access to gold. Russia does not need Sudanese 
resources because it has more access to natural resources in other African countries where 
they are more plentiful and profitable. Instead, any Russian interest in Sudan “might be 
representative of Putin’s desire to re-instate Russia as a great power, or could represent the 
personal economic interests of the oligarchs, maintaining Putin’s hold on power” versus an 
interest in obtaining natural resources for Russian use.135  
e. H2e: Russia engages in MTC to economically satisfy the regime’s domestic 
political clients 
Russian MTC in Sudan is strongly motivated by economically satisfying the Putin 
regime’s domestic political clients. Although Russian SOEs have not invested extensively in 
Sudan, private Russian companies, often managed by individuals with close ties to the 
Russian regime, have invested extensively. Yevgeny Priogozhin, the Russian businessman, 
suspected financial supporter of the Wagner Group, and close confidant of President Putin 
 
133 “Sudan, Russia Ink Agreement for Natural Gas Exploration,” Xinhua, July 25, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/25/c_137346081.htm. 
134 “Treasury Targets Financier’s Illicit Sanctions Evasion Activity,” U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, July 15, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1058. 
135 Marten, “Russia’s Back in Africa,” 157. 
43 
has investments all across Africa, one of them being M Invest. According to Africa 
Intelligence: West Africa Newsletter, M Invest already controls gold sites in Sudan.136 
Bashir’s Sochi meeting with Putin resulted in M Invest’s preferential access to Sudanese gold 
reserves. The results of this meeting demonstrates how a diplomatic visit created an 
investment opportunity for a Russian oligarch with links to PMCs.137 Prigozhin’s 
involvement in Sudan “highlights the interplay between Russia’s paramilitary operations, 
support for preserving authoritarian regimes, and exploitation of natural resources.”138  
Private Russian companies, such as Wagner or M Invest, are more active in Sudan 
than SOEs. A recent press release from the U.S. Department of the Treasury stated “Yevgeniy 
Prigozhin and his network are exploiting Sudan’s natural resources for personal gain and 
spreading malign influence around the globe.”139 This increase in investment has been 
intertwined with the increase in Russian MTC. M Invest’s preferential access to Sudanese 
gold sites is one example of this phenomenon.140 The company’s acquisition of “prospecting 
rights for gold in late 2017 coincided with the arrival of Russian military contractors to train 
Sudanese forces.”141  
Wagner’s deployment to Sudan helped the Russian government “reach agreements 
for the rights to potential diamond and gold deposits for Prigozhin-linked companies”142 
Reynold and Reynolds claim these “are best understood as payoffs to Prigozhin, helping him 
to finance and profit from Wagner in return for aiding the Kremlin’s foreign policy ambitions” 
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verses adding value to the Russian economy.143 Marten argues it is unlikely Prigozhin is 
making a profit off his investments connected to Wagner themselves because the energy and 
mining contracts are “artisanal (in other words, people sift the dirt with sieves), not the 
sophisticated industrial mines that are usually associated with profitability today.”144 Instead, 
Prigozhin uses his contracts to launder money or skim money off of profits stemming from 
“contract[s] to provide guard service for mineral or energy businesses.”145 Specifically, it is 
believed that Wagner might provide guard services for M Invest’s gold sites.146 
The use of PMCs to protect clients is beneficial for the clients of Putin’s regime. 
Prigozhin’s use of PMCs in Sudan enriches him, and as a politically important client he in 
turn supports Putin’s hold on power. This economic motivation maintains the vertical power 
structure to Putin in two ways. First, these agreements ensure only Putin’s favorite groups or 
entities can economically profit from these activities by restricting the access to resources 
since PMCs are illegal and unconstitutional in Russia.147 Second, PMCs must share any 
wealth earned with the regime, which can in turn prosecute the PMC against the mercenary 
law, keeping them loyal to the regime.148  
Domestic oligarchs hold a great deal of power and influence in Russia, and without 
their support, Putin would have encounter difficulty in maintaining his illiberal democratic 
rule in Russia. According to Marten, “formal government institutions matter far less in Russia 
than do informal network connections between members of the elite, joined together in a 
loose, evolving, an internally fractious hierarchy. The system is based on patronage.”149 
Russian MTC to Sudan supported both Bashir and Prigozhin. Prigozhin most likely skims 
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profits off of every contract, benefiting himself and his inner circle.150 Marten’s testimony 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs states “it would also not be surprising if [Prigozhin] 
used these mining and energy businesses as a cover for smuggling, money laundering, or other 
illegal behavior.”151  
f. Conclusion of Economic Motivations 
Russian MTC in Sudan is strongly motivated by the desire to economically satisfy the 
regime’s political clients by providing them with investment opportunities in Sudan. This 
motivation has both economic and political dimensions. It is economic in the sense that regime 
insiders derive material benefit. It is political in the sense that, in order to preserve power, 
Putin must ensure access to economic opportunities for the Russian elite. Russian MTC to 
Sudan is not motivated by gaining access to the general goods market in Sudan. It is also 
unlikely that Russian MTC to Sudan is motivated by obtaining access to natural resources, 
creating investment opportunities, or increasing the market for Russian arms. While some of 
these things may be occurring in Sudan, they are not currently driven by MTC. 
E. SUDAN CASE STUDY CONCLUSION 
Russian MCT to Sudan is primarily motivated by a combination of political and 
economic gains through economic enrichment of domestic clients. MTC enabled Russia to 
create deals for domestic Russian clients, which helped to support Putin’s hold on power. 
Russia’s interests focus on the domestic political clients however, therefore as long as the 
MTC agreements were honored by the CLTG, Putin is able to maintain his domestic political 
strength as well as strengthen Russia’s sphere of influence, continuing the pre-Cold War 
involvement in Sudan through the Bashir regime to the CLTG. 
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III. ALGERIA 
Algeria provides another case in which to understand the motivations of Russian 
MTC. Algeria is a relevant case study in understanding Russian MTC to Africa because 
Algeria received the largest amount of Russian arms in Africa totaling $11.5 billion between 
2000 and 2018.152 Understanding why Algeria receives such a significant amount of arms 
from Russia provides insight into motivations for Russian MTC in Africa. In this chapter, I 
show that the primary motivations of Russian MTC to Algeria from 2000 to 2018 were to 
strengthen diplomatic ties, increase the market for arms, provide opportunities for SOEs, and 
to economically satisfy the regime’s domestic political clients. The chapter concludes that 
Russian motivations for MTC in Algeria are a mix of political and economic, which support 
Russian oligarchs and therefore Putin’s hold on power. 
To assess Russian MTC motivation in Algeria between 1999–2018, this chapter 
addresses both historical context in Algeria and contemporary Russian MTC. The first part of 
this chapter provides a brief history of Algerian domestic history. This section demonstrates 
how the relationship between Algeria, Russia, and the United States evolved over time. The 
second section elaborates on MTC after the Cold War to include arms, military agreements, 
and counterterrorism efforts. The third section evaluates the potential political and economic 
motivations of Russian MTC in Algeria, determining that Russian motivations for MTC in 
Algeria were both political and economic, both of which strengthen Putin’s hold on power.  
A. ALGERIA INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 
Algeria’s colonial history contributes to its close relationship with Russia. Algeria was 
not only colonized but also incorporated into France. In the view of the French, Algeria was 
not simply a colony but a part of Greater France. The Algerian War of Independence (1954-
1962) was filled with extreme violence on both sides. The Soviet Union established relations 
with Algeria immediately after its independence in 1962. Between 1962 and 1989 Alegria 
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purchased approximately $11 billion dollars in Soviet arms, “including aircraft, tanks, various 
ships, small arms, and ammunition.”153  
During the Algerian War of Independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
utilized growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union to its advantage. 
Playing on the West’s fears of growing communist movements, the early rebels used the 
possibility of a communist Algeria to push the West to encourage France to grant 
independence to Algeria, making the War of Independence an international concern.154 Since 
then, the West has tended to associate Algeria more with Russia than with the United States 
and other western partners. The Soviet Union greatly increased its arms deals to Algeria after 
Algeria won its independence; the peak of its arms trade totaling $1,845 million in 1979.155 
The spending continued. The U.S. Library of Congress estimates that during 1985–1989 
alone, “Algerian arms imports totaled US$3,260 million, of which US$2,700 million 
originated in the Soviet Union.”156 The large amount of arms imports created a large Algerian 
debt to the Soviet Union. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly establish 
Russian Federation turned inwards, not returning to consistent arms deals with Algeria until 
1999.157  
Russian-Algerian relations strengthened after Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president 
of Algeria in 1999, leading Russia to “expand its political and economic presence in the 
Maghreb and to redefine its foreign policy in North Africa” after years of limited involvement 
in the Maghreb.158 Putin resurged into Algeria, primarily through arms deals. The immense 
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amount of arms recently supplied to Algeria has entrenched Russia as a key economic and 
MTC partner in Algeria. At the same time, Russia has started to invest in other sectors in 
Algeria, including its growing energy sector; Algeria became a gas exporting nation during 
the Algerian War of Independence and quickly became one of the largest producers of gas in 
the world. Although French President Francois Hollande acknowledged the Algerian 
suffering caused by French colonization, French and Algerian relations remained tense as 
Hollande did not apologize for the atrocities perpetuated by the French. The lack of apology 
continues to be a major sticking point for Algeria. Ultimately Algeria’s history of internal 
political upheaval, terrorism, and tensions with France aligned Algeria away from the West 
and toward Russia, creating an opportunity for Russian MTC to Algeria to expand.  
B. ALGERIA DOMESTIC BACKGROUND 
Russia’s MTC with Algeria since the 1990s occurred over a period of descent into 
conflict, both for Russia and for Algeria.159 Both Russia and Algeria “experienced major 
upheavals in the 1990s. Algeria was immersed in a bloody civil war against a militant Islamist 
movement while Russia struggled to overcome the trauma of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and waged a long counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya.”160 While Russia’s fight 
against the Chechens after the dissolution of the USSR further drove the USSR into debt, the 
Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) set the stage for Russia’s resurgence into Algeria. 
Domestic turbulence and international relations played a significant role in driving 
Algeria toward Russia. The civil war, fought between the government and an Islamist 
insurgency, resulted in the death of approximately 200,000 civilians.161 The war broke out 
over the government disbandment of the Islamist political party, the Islamic Salvation Front 
(ISF), in 1992. The military saw ISF rule as unacceptable, and as the ISF gained popularity 
and parliamentary seats, the military staged a coup, forcing Chadi Bendjedid to resign and 
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replacing him with Mohamed Boudiaf, an exiled FLN leader. Boudiaf’s rule lasted four 
months before he was assassinated by a member of his bodyguard. The disbandment of the 
ISF and the military coup were catalysts for 10 years of conflict between the government and 
Islamist groups in Algeria.162 One of these groups was the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC), which was founded in 1998.163 Its mission was “the overthrow of the 
Algerian government and establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Maghreb [to] enforce 
Shariah law.”164 In 1999, during the civil war, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president of 
Algeria after opposition candidates withdrew over concerns about fairness and transparency 
of voting.165 He then approved a law on civil concord, the result of secret negotiations 
between the government and the armed wing of the ISF. The Algerian Civil War officially 
ended in 2002, being marked by thousands of members pardoned and a decline in violence. 
That is, until the GSPC ramped up attacks in Algeria and aligned with al-Qaeda, renaming 
itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2006.166  
In 2006, al-Qaeda started a new round of Islamist attacks in Algeria. It simultaneous 
expanded through the Maghreb and started to support other Islamist extremist groups. In 2010, 
Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, several of the countries impacted by AQIM, set up a 
joint command to combat terrorism.167 The year 2011 brought an increase of civilian protests 
stemming from food prices and unemployment.168 In response, Bouteflika lifted the state of 
emergency, which was originally issued in 1992.169 In 2013, terrorism in Algeria became 
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international news as dozens of foreign hostages were killed by Islamist al-Murabitoun group 
at In Amenas gas plant.170  
In April 2014, Bouteflika won another term as president in elections that the 
opposition called flawed. The Algerian parliament passed a constitutional reform in 2016, 
limiting presidents to a two-term limit.171 Bouteflika attempted to run for a fifth term in early 
2019, which resulted in mass protests, ultimately leading to Bouteflika’s resignation in April 
2019 amidst the political turmoil. Abdelmadjid Tebboune was controversially elected as 
president of Algeria in December 2019. Since then, massive popular protests have continued. 
Putin’s MTC to Algeria has focused on arms sales and diplomatic agreements, which 
correlate chronologically with Russian economic trade goals and the broader cementing of 
relations to benefit the Russian economy. Other forms of MTC to Algeria, including joint 
counterterrorism efforts, supporting Russian goals to reduce the spread of extremism in North 
Africa and the Middle East, which creeps toward the Russian sphere of influence.  
C. RUSSIAN MTC IN ALGERIA 
Russian MTC to Algeria, which is largely based on arms sales, has increased since the 
formal establishment of relations between the two countries in 1962. The 2008 spike of 
Russian MTC to Algeria was a result of the debt relief deal in 2007, which was tied to an 
extensive weapons contact. Besides arms sales, Russian MTC to Algeria also has an 
operational component, although it is much smaller than the Russian arms sale to Algeria.  
1. Arms 
Russian arms deals are the largest component of Russian MTC in Algeria. During the 
Cold War, Algeria primarily imported aircraft (mostly helicopters), air defense systems 
(surface to air missiles and radar), armored vehicles, and ships. After the Cold War, Algeria 
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to Algeria were inconsistent for a few years between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 
Russia’s resurgence into Africa in 1999. Although 1999 was the beginning of Russia’s 
consistent arms resurgence in Algeria, trading arms every year from 1999 until 2018, the 
amounts were initially low, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Arms Exports from Russia to Algeria (Millions of Dollars)173  
A big shift in Algerian–Russian arms trade occurred when Russia forgave Algeria’s 
war debt in 2007. After Putin’s visit to Algeria in 2007, “Algeria’s debt to Russia was 
converted into weapons supply contract.” 174 In the deal, Algeria agreed to buy “USD 7.5 
billion in Russian military equipment in exchange for a write-off of Algeria’s USD 4.7 billion 
in debt to Russia.”175 As a result of this deal, Russian arms sales to Algeria immediately more 
than doubled, from $202 million in 2006 to $506 million in 2007 (Figure 3). They rose even 
 
173 Adapted from “TIV of Arms Exports from Russia, 2000–2018.” 
174 Quoted from Algerian political journalist Akram Kharief “An Overview of Russia-Algeria 
Military Cooperation,” New Defence Order Strategy, April 21, 2020, https://dfnc.ru/en/vtc/an-overview-of-
russia-algeria-military-cooperation/. 
175 Malek Mousli, “Algerian-Russian Cooperation: True Strategic Partnership?,” Vestnik RUDN. 
International Relations 19, no. 2 (2019): 287–88, https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2019-19-2-284-292; 
Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria Spat Shows Challenge to Russian Arms Sales,” Reuters, April 1, 2008, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-russia-military-idUSCHI64414920080401. 
53 
more the next year, reaching $1510 million in 2008. The deal also required Algeria “to allocate 
a substantial part of its defence budget to purchase Russian equipment.’”176 As shown in 
Figure 4, between 2006 and 2016, Algeria increased its percentage of GDP allocated to 
defense spending from under 3% to almost 6.5%.  
 
Figure 4. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)—Algeria177  
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Between 2000 and 2018, the levels of Russian arms exports to Algeria were 
inconsistent, but averaged $639 million per year.178 Overall, Algeria was a significant 
market for Russian arms sales; from 2000 to 2018, Algeria was the third largest importer 
of Russian arms worldwide.179 During the same period, Algeria was the highest recipient 
of Russian arms in Africa between 2000 to 2018 for a total of $11,503 million.180  
Some examples of significant Russian arms deliveries to Algeria include the 
following. In 2014, Algeria ordered two kilo class submarines, costing over $1.2 billion, 
with a delivery date of 2018.181 In 2015, Algeria purchased 14 SU-30MKI(A) Jet Fighters 
for $1.0 billion and, in 2018, 16 MIG-29M/M2 Jet Fighters for $800,0000.182 In total, from 
2007 to 2019, the Algerian Air Force received 58 Su-30 fighters from Russia.183  
This level of arms purchases has made Algeria’s military highly dependent on 
Russian arms imports. As Djallel Khechib from the Humanitarian and Social Research 
Center observed in 2018, “Russia is the main supplier of Algerian weapons, the Russian 
weapon represents more than 75% of the Algerian army’s weapons and Algeria also holds 
for 52% of the Russian arms market in Africa.”184 Some reports estimate Russian weapons 
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represent upwards of 85% of Algeria’s weapons.185 Russian T-90 tanks and the S-300 air 
defense systems make up the majority of the Algeria’s defense system.186  
2. Agreements 
In 2001, Algeria and Russia established the Declaration on Strategic Partnership, 
which established core principles for long-term bilateral policy goals between Russia and 
Algeria and “allowed Russia to step up military-technical cooperation by supplying arms 
and military equipment.”187 This was the first strategic partnership agreement for 
strengthening and expanding relations between an Arab/African country and the Russian 
Federation.188 Algeria and Russia have purportedly engaged in other MTC discussions and 
may have established other MTC agreements. For example, in 2010, Dmitry Medvedev, 
then President of Russia, visited Algeria to discuss “the development of industrial 
cooperation, investment projects, and military and technical cooperation.”189 However, 
details about these discussions and possible MTC agreements are not available. 
3. Operations 
In addition to arms and agreements, since the early 2000s, after Algeria’s Civil War 
and the spread of Islamic extremism across sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, Russian 
MTC with Algeria has also focused on counterterrorism efforts. Current Russian 
Ambassador to Algeria Igor Belyaev relayed that “the two countries share more than 
economic, political and cultural relations. [Belyaev] stressed that there is cooperation 
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between Russia and Algeria in combating terrorism.”190 This cooperation includes Russian 
consultations with Algeria on security cooperation and countering terrorist threats.191 
Since October 2015, Algeria has participated in the international counterterrorism database 
set up by the Russian Federal Security Service. This database is part of Russia’s wider anti-
terrorism effort.192 This database aims to dry up the financing of international terrorism, 
including funding acquired by kidnapping ransoms.193 
In addition to joint counterterrorism activities, Algeria and Russia have slowly 
increased participation in joint military exercises. In 2018, Algeria was one of six African 
countries to join the International Army Games, a Russian military sports event organized 
by the Russian Ministry of Defense.194 
D. MOTIVATIONS FOR RUSSIAN MTC IN ALGERIA 
Overall, Russia is more engaged and invested in its relationship with Algeria 
compared to many other countries in Africa because the Putin regime and country as a 
whole benefit politically and economically from MTC engagement in Algeria. Algeria has 
become a key partner in North Africa and has helped Russia expand its economy and 
political sphere of influence. While it is difficult to be definitive with motivations, there 
are strong indicators that Russia’s primary political motivations for MTC in Algeria are to 
strengthen diplomatic relations and that its primary economic motivations are to gain 
access to the Algerian arms market, provide investment opportunities for SOEs, and 
economically satisfy domestic clients. At this time there is little evidence that motivations 
related to international institutions, antagonizing the West, increasing market access, and 
access to natural resources are important drivers of Russian MTC to Algeria from 2000 to 
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2018. Finally, gaining military access and countering extremism had mixed results due to 
availability of evidence. 
1. Political Explanation 
This section demonstrates that the primary political motivations for Russian MTC 
in Algeria (Table 4) are to strengthen diplomatic ties with African states. Table 4 lists the 
specific hypotheses regarding potential political motivations for Russian MTC in Algeria 
that are tested in this section and identifies whether or not that hypothesis is supported by 
available data. There is little evidence that motivations related to international institutions 
or antagonizing the West as important drivers to Russian MTC to Algeria from 2000–2018. 
In addition, due to a lack of publicly available evidence, it was difficult to determine if 
Russian MTC was motivated by gaining military access or countering extremism, therefore 
the results were mixed. Ultimately it is likely that Russian MTC to Algeria is motivated by 
strengthening diplomatic ties and countering extremism.  
Table 4. Political Motivations in Algeria 
H1: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill political goals Presence in Algeria 
(Y/N/Maybe) 
H1a: Russia engages in MTC to establish or strengthen diplomatic ties with 
African states 
Y 
H1b: Russia engages in MTC to induce partner countries to support its 
positions in international institutions 
N 
H1c: Russia engages in MTC to gain military access to partner countries Mixed 
H1d: Russia engages in MTC to counter extremism Mixed 
H1e: Russia engages in MTC to displace/antagonize the West N 
 
a. H1a: Russia Engages in MTC to Establish or Strength Diplomatic Ties 
with African States and Algeria 
Russia wants to strengthen diplomatic ties with Algeria because of its strategic 
position in the Mediterranean and its regional strength, which projects Russian political 
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influence in North Africa. Algeria’s Cold War ties to Russia as well as their shared values 
make Algeria an easy partnership to strengthen. According to Algerian Foreign Minister 
Abdelkader Messahel’s 2017 speech about “Learning to Live Together” during the UN’s 
International Day of Living Together in Peace: 
Algeria and Russia are promoting international peace, global security and 
stability, advancing more just and balanced system of international relations 
based on collective decision-making, primacy of international law, equal 
partnership relations with the central coordinating roll of the UN as the 
principal organization regulating international relations.195 
Algeria is a key country for Russia’s efforts to gain political influence in Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa. Russia’s MTC to Algeria helps Russia’s larger effort of 
strengthening diplomatic ties across the southern Mediterranean countries as “Russia’s 
aggression in Eastern Europe and the Middle East reestablishes the Mediterranean and the 
Black Seas as major strategic regions.”196 MTC to Algeria is part of a larger effort to gain 
diplomatic access to the Mediterranean countries.197 Russia sees Algeria as an opportunity 
to expand foreign policy goals by “rebuilding its relationship with [Algeria, which has] a 
major role to play in the Middle East and strong ties to Europe.”198 Russia hopes that the 
increase of diplomatic efforts since the 2000s will “rebuild ties with some of its former 
clients, capitalizing on legacy relationships, the turmoil that swept the region in the wake 
of the Arab Spring, and the power vacuum resulting from disengagement or the lack of 
interest by the United States and its allies.”199  
Russian MTC appeared as part of Russia’s broader effort to strengthen diplomatic 
and economic ties with Algeria. The increasing levels of MTC to Algeria after 2007 was 
 
195 Mousli, “Algerian-Russian Cooperation,” 289. 
196 Seth Blaine, “Russia Gaining Influence in Mediterranean,” Center for Security Policy, June 29, 
2018, https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2018/06/29/russia-gaining-influence-in-mediterranean/. 
197 Blaine; Derek Lutterbeck and Georgij Engelbrecht, “The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: 
Towards a Renewed Rivalry?,” Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 3 (November 10, 2009): 385–406, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390903346905; Anna Borshchevskaya and Mohamed Eljarh, “Russia in the 
Mediterranean: Strategies and Aspirations,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, no. 12 (January 2018): 12. 
198 Rumer, Russia in the Middle East, 37. 
199 Rumer, 31. 
59 
correlated with a number of bilateral agreements and head of state visits between Russia 
and Algeria. In 2006, Putin visited Algiers; this was the first visit by a Russian leader in 30 
years. This visit resulted in the cancelation of the Algerian debt in 2007, mentioned 
previously, as well as the development of strong economic partnerships: specifically, the 
states’ arms deal and access to Algerian gas.200 Then-president Medvedev visited Algeria 
in 2010. The Kremlin website announced that discussions during that visit addressed the 
“development of industrial cooperation, investment projects, and military and technical 
cooperation.” No new deals were signed, but Medvedev and Bouteflika issued a joint 
statement.201 Medvedev visited again in October 2017 to “discuss further development of 
cooperation in the trade-and-economic, energy, humanitarian, and cultural spheres.”202 
The visit resulted in five cooperation agreements between Russia and Algeria, which 
spanned the sectors Medvedev mentioned. In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov visited Algeria for a total of 6 times between 2000–2019.203 Bouteflika in turn 
visited Moscow in 2001 and 2008.204 These visits resulted in many of the aforementioned 
diplomatic agreements, which brought Russia and Algeria closer together.  
b. H1b: Russia Engages in MTC to Induce Algeria to Support its Positions 
in International Institutions 
It is unlikely that Russian MTC induces Algeria to support Russian positions in 
international institutions. Ideally, there would be a direct correlation of Russian MTC to 
Algeria either before a big international United Nations (UN) vote, or an increase of 
Russian MTC to Algeria after Algeria casts a favorable vote for Russia. Since it takes time 
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to deliver MTC, it is only possible to observe general trends. Algeria tends to vote similarly 
to Russia in the United Nations, voting 69% in agreement with Russia compared to the 
31% with the United States.205 This reflects 0.6 to 0.8 voting coincidence with Russia.206 
During the Cold War, Algeria’s voting coincidence was consistently higher than its voting 
coincidence with the United States. In 1989, at the starkest difference, Algeria’s voting 
coincidence was 0.96 with the USSR and 0.20 with the U.S.207 While the collapse of the 
Soviet Union closed the gap, Algeria maintained voting coincidence with Russia, dipping 
to 0.65 in 1993, but still twice as much as the 0.3 voting coincidence with the United 
States.208 Algeria’s voting patterns have not changed from the Cold War-era to the post-
Cold War-era. Algeria stayed around 69% agreement with Russian votes in the UN from 
2000 to 2018.209 In addition, Algeria’s voting patterns in alignment with the United States 
have stayed low, staying under 0.3 voting coincidence from 2000 to 2016.210  
In addition, Algeria has abstained in seven important recent UN votes in relation to 
Russian foreign policy. These votes are displayed in Table 4.211 Thus, despite years of 
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increasing MTC to Algeria, its voting patterns did not change. Out of 193 UN members, 
Algeria was one of approximately 71 countries that on average abstained for each of the 
seven resolutions.212 However, some countries actively sided with Russian interests by 
voting “no.” As shown in Table 4, on average, 21 countries voted “no” for the seven 
resolutions, supporting Russian policy goals. This means that, while Algeria had multiple 
opportunities to support Russian interests, it chose to abstain and stay neutral. These 
behaviors could indicate that MTC has no effect on Algeria’s voting patterns or that the 
MTC is helping to maintain the Cold War-era status quo; maybe Algeria would actively 
oppose Russia without MTC. However, given Russia’s continued MTC with Algeria, 
despite two decades of only moderate support, it is more likely that its MTC is not 
motivated by a desire to acquire support in the UN 
Table 5. Algerian Votes Compared to General Voting Breakdown in UN213 
Resolution Algerian Vote 
General Voting 
Yes No Abstained Non-Voting 
Resolution calling upon states not to 
recognize changes in status of 
Crimea region (2014) 
Abstained 100 11 58 N/A 
Situation of human rights in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) 
(2016) 
Abstained 70 26 77 N/A 
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Resolution Algerian Vote 
General Voting 
Yes No Abstained Non-Voting 
Situation of human rights in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) 
(2017) 
Abstained 70 26 76 21 
Situation of human rights in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) 
(2018) 
Abstained 65 27 70 31 
Situation of human rights in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) 
(2019) 
Abstained 65 23 83 22 
Problem of the militarization of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, 
as well as parts of the Black Sea and 
the Sea of Azov (2018) 
Abstained 66 19 72 36 
Problem of the militarization of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, 
as well as parts of the Black Sea and 
the Sea of Azov (2019) 
Abstained 63 19 66 45 
 
 
c. H1c: Russia Engages in MTC to Gain Military Access to Algeria 
Russian MTC in Algeria is likely motivated by gaining military access in Algeria 
because of its general interest in gaining military access in the region, however the results 
are mixed based on the unavailability of evidence and strict Algerian rules which limit 
foreign militaries access to Algeria. If Russia had this motive, we would expect to see 
efforts to establish basing agreements or an increased Russian military presence in Algeria, 
including the stationing of troops, Russian military operations, or joint military exercises 
within Algerian territory. None of these have occurred or been publicly announced between 
2000–2018. This suggests either that Russia is not attempting to use MTC to increase its 
access to Algeria or that it has been unsuccessful in these efforts.  
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Russia wants to establish bases along the southern Mediterranean sea.214 As 
Stephan Blank, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, states, “Moscow 
has a base in Syria; seeks bases in Yemen, Egypt and Libya; has been offered bases in 
Sudan and Eritrea; is building a facility in Somaliland, and has stated its desire for one in 
Algeria.”215 However, while there has been a lot of rhetoric about military partnership and 
looking for basing access, there have been no concrete action toward establishing bases or 
gaining basing rights in Algeria.  
Alternatively, Russia may simply be unsuccessful in obtaining military access 
because of Algeria’s strict rules about what foreign militaries can do inside the country. 
Specifically, Algerians “do not allow foreign military installations within their borders.”216 
Russian efforts in Libya, however, suggest that, if provided the opportunity, Russia would 
aim for military access in the region, possibly including Algeria. According to Blaine, 
Russia aims to establish Libya as a major military an economic partner, which can help 
Russia create a sphere of influence in the region and put pressure on the west.217 Russia 
has also taken advantage of the lack of American presence in Libya by providing covert 
military support to include intelligence sharing and military advising.218 If Algeria were 
to open up to foreign military, based on Russia’s interest in the Mediterranean and its 
growing involvement in Libya, it is plausible Russia would try to become involved in 
Algeria through providing the same MTC as it does to Libya. Because this has not yet 
happened, this hypothesis’ conclusion is mixed.  
d. H1d: Russia Engages in MTC to Counter Extremism 
It is likely that Russia engages in MTC to counter extremism in Algeria and the 
greater Maghreb because it shares an interest in countering extremism in the region and 
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has provided relevant equipment to Algeria. However, besides rhetoric and equipment, it 
does not seem like Russia actively engages in counter extremism operations or training. 
Consequently, the evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. 
Russian rhetoric demonstrates its concern on counterterrorism and the stability of 
African states generally. According to an interview of Putin by TASS, Russia’s regional 
security cooperation aims “to help Africans solve existing security issues themselves, as it 
will strengthen African states, their sovereignty and independence. And hence, the world 
will be more stable and more predictable.”219 In particular, Putin believes African states 
need support and significant aid in order to combat terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab.220 Putin cited Russia’s past 
experience fighting terrorism in Syria as a reason why African countries seek Russian MTC 
aid to counter extremism, not only by participating in exercises and weapons sales, but by 
providing military and peacekeeper training.221 In addition, according to Seth Blaine from 
the Center for Security Policy, the Mediterranean is important to Russia to protect its 
domestic assets and project power against the West through counter terrorism support.222 
It does not seem however, that Russia is making meaningful efforts in exercises, training 
operations, or support in Algeria based on information available to the public. If these 
efforts were happening, it would likely be publicized; yet, this does not seem to be the case 
with Algeria specifically.  
A second factor that suggests that Russian aims to counter extremism through its 
MTC is the type of Russian equipment supplied to Algeria. Russian MTC to Algeria has 
strengthened the security service’s counterterrorism measures, specifically by providing 
helicopters, which are a crucial part in counter terrorism surveillance, patrols, and incident 
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responses in Algeria.223 Russian naval weapons systems also help “to control [Algeria’s] 
territorial waters and coast lines from both the threat of smaller targets (smugglers, terrorist 
infiltration by coast-line) and larger targets that may threaten the integrity of their territorial 
waters.”224 Russian MTC to Algeria also provided greater capacity and flexibility for the 
Algerian regime’s “internal crackdowns, without sacrificing any military power for 
defense against external threats.”225 The types of Russian MTC supplied to Algeria, 
specifically Mi-26/Halo Transport Helicopters and Mi-28/Havoc Attack Helicopters 
enable the Algerian military “the ability to quickly react to external and internal threats by 
putting large number of troops on the ground and providing immediate CAS (Close Air 
Support).”226 These security strengthening efforts may make it more difficult for terrorist 
groups to operate in Algeria. On the other hand, these equipment sales could be linked to 
increasing the market for Russian arms than direct support for counterterrorism. Without 
further information, this hypothesis concludes with a mixed result.  
e. H1e: Russia Engages in MTC to Displace/Antagonize the West 
Russia does not engage in MTC to displace the West in Algeria because the West, 
specifically the United States, has such little engagement in Algeria that there is little 
western influence to displace. Russia has been Algeria’s leading great power partner since 
the country gained its independence from France. Algeria has very weak ties to the United 
States. Missy Ryan from the Washington Post reported, “Algeria buys virtually no 
American military gear, bridling at U.S. conditions on armament exports. The only 
American troops in the country are stationed at the embassy. [Algeria] does not invite U.S. 
force to conduct major training missions, as other regional nations do.” However the 
relationship between the United States and Algeria is changing toward increased 
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cooperation.227 In comparison, Russia’s MTC to Algeria increased after 2007 to include 
arms purchases and, slowly, Algeria’s participation in Russia military exercises, such as 
the International Army games in 2018.228 This demonstrates not only the West’s lack of 
engagement in Algeria, but also Algeria’s preference toward Russia over the United States.  
In addition, it is unlikely that Russian MTC is motived by antagonizing the West 
as Russian MTC actions do not contravene UN sanctions. Nor has MTC worsened U.S.-
Algerian relationships. Therefore, Russian MTC to Algeria is not motivated by 
antagonizing the West.  
f. Political Conclusions 
Russian MTC with Algeria has been described as “a matter of choice, or 
opportunity, rather than necessity, guided by opportunities as they presented 
themselves.”229 However, Russia has political objectives in mind when it engages in MTC 
with another country, and this is especially true with MTC to Algeria. The evidence points 
to a correlation between two of Russia’s political goals—strengthening diplomatic ties with 
African states, interest in military access, and countering extremism—and its MTC 
activities in Algeria. Russia’s strong relationship with Algeria is continuously reinforced 
through MTC engagement. Nonetheless, Russia’s motivations for MTC in Algeria extend 
past political motivations. As the next section finds, Russia is also economically motivated 
for engaging in MTC in Algeria.  
 
2. Economic Explanations 
Russia’s need to rebuild its economy after the fall of the USSR initially provided 
many of the economic motivations for Russian MTC in Algeria. By cancelling Algerian 
debt in exchange for larger arms deals, Russia was able to stabilize Algeria’s? economy 
and develop a reliable and consistent arms trading partner. In addition, Russian state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) were able to invest in energy projects, satisfying Russian oligarchs who 
tend to head these companies and have ties to Putin’s regime. Table 6 summarizes the 
hypotheses tested in this section and the section’s findings. Russian MTC is likely 
motivated by access to the arms market, investment opportunities for Russian SOEs, and 
satisfying domestic clients. However, the evidence does not support that Russia provides 
MTC to Algeria to increase the market for Russian goods generally, nor to gain access to 
natural resources.  
Table 6. Economic Motivations in Algeria 
H2: Russia engages in MTC primarily to fulfill economic goals  Presence in Algeria 
(Y/N/Maybe) 
H2a: Russia engages in MTC to increase market for Russian exports generally N 
H2b: Russia engages in MTC to increase the market for Russian arms Y 
H2c: Russia engages in MTC to obtain access to natural resources  N 
H2d: Russia engages in MTC to create investment opportunities for Russian 
SOEs  
Y 




a. H2a: Russia Engages in MTC in Increase Market for Russian exports 
Generally 
Putin has said that Russia seeks greater trade diversification and partnership 
opportunities with Africa generally.230 However, while there was an expansion of the 
Algerian-Russian economic relationship from 2000–2018, Dmitry Medvedev’s 
“development of industrial cooperation, investment projects, and military and technical 
cooperation” agreements did not specifically pertain to Russian exports.231 Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that Russia is not engaging in MTC with Algeria in the interest of 
increasing markets for Russian exports generally. Algeria has never been a very large 
export market for Russia. As Figure 5 shows, from 1999 to 2015, the percentage of Russia’s 
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exports that went to Algeria averaged 0.17%.232 Russian exports to Algeria did not go over 
.4% of its total exports until 2016. By 2018, Algeria had become Russia’s second largest 
export market in Africa, consuming 1.07% of total Russian exports, following behind 
Egypt’s 1.35%.233 While the overall percentage increased, this is a small amount of 
Russia’s export market, demonstrating its lack of interest in gaining access to the Algerian 
market generally.  
 
Figure 5. Share of Russia’s Exports (% of Total Exports)—Algeria234  
More importantly, export trends do not correlate to increases in Russian MTC to 
Algeria. While Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate a general increase in exports to Algeria, it is 
unlikely that the increase of Russian MTC to Algeria is responsible for the increase in 
general exports to Algeria, as Russia’s total exports to Algeria did not increase in 
conjunction with the resurgence of MTC. Instead, these increases seem to occur separately. 
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As shown in Figure 6, Russian arms sales spiked from 2007–2008. Figure 7 indicates that 
there was no accompanying increase in Russia’s exports during that time.  
 
Figure 6. Russian Arms and General Exports (in Millions USD)—Algeria235 
While Russian exports to Algeria increased in value over time, the spikes in 2012 
and from 2016 to 2018 as seen in Figure 7 do not relate to any specific MTC deals to 
Algeria. In addition, although Russian arms sales to Algeria also rose in 2016 (see Figure 
6), they subsequently declined, while Russia’s general exports continued to rise after 2015, 
the rise was more likely caused by general economic trends instead of Russian involvement 
through MTC. 
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Figure 7. Russian Gross Exports (in Millions USD)—Algeria236  
Finally, Russia’s biggest export years of general goods to Algeria were from 2016 
to 2018. The largest share of these goods was in a category labeled other, meaning 
“commodities not specified according to kind.”237 Even at these peak export years, the 
available evidence does not support that Russian MTC is motivated by gaining access to 
the Algerian market. 
b. H2b: Russia Engages in MTC to Increase the Market for Russian Arms 
Russian arms are an important part of Russia’s international trade and arms sales 
are a major component of Russia’s MTC relationship with Algeria, significantly increasing 
the market for Russian arms. With upwards of 85% of Algerian arms coming from Russia, 
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Russia continues to have a strong monopoly on the arms market in Algeria,238 making it a 
reliable market for Russian arms exports. Arms dependency means that as technology 
develops, Russia will always be able to sell it to Algeria and will be less concerned about 
competing in the arms market with countries such as the United States. MTC such as 
diplomatic meetings and weapons are used to increase the market for Russian arms.  
As discussed earlier, the value of Russia’s arms sales to Algeria has increased 
significantly since 2007, after the state relieved Algeria’s Soviet-era debt in exchange for 
agreements to purchase $7.5 billion worth of arms. Before 2007 Russian arms sales to 
Algeria comprised under 10% of Russia’s total arms sales (see Figure 8). In 2007, Algeria 
represented 9.14% of total Russian arm sales for that year. The percentage spikes to 24.15% 
in 2008 after the debt relief and signing of arms deals. While the percentage decreased over 
the next 6 years, bottoming out at 3.82%, the percentage increased again to 23.21% in 
2016, around the time of the economic sanctions against Russia for the annexation of 
Crimea. 
This income was particularly important to Russia during the 2008 great recession, 
which had negative economic impacts for the Russian economy, including its arms sales, 
as seen in Figure 8. In 2008, Russia exported $6253 billion dollars of arms sales 
globally.239 Of that, Algeria represents $1510 billion dollars, or 24% of arms exports that 
year.240 This large amount of arms sales indicates the importance of the Algerian arms 
market to Russia. 
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Figure 8. Percentage of Russian Arms Sales to Algeria241  
Arms sales were also important to Russia after the UN imposed sanctions on Russia 
after the annexation of Crimea. The sanctions’ impact on the Russian economy is widely 
discussed. In addition, the sanctions played a role in Russia’s economic slump from 2014 
to 2016, causing Russia to want to boost the economy.242 In 2016, two years after 
economic sanctions were enacted, Russia exported $6841 billions of dollars of arms 
globally.243 Of that amount, Algeria represented $1588 billions of dollars, or 23% of arms 
sales that year.244 This income potentially helped Russia manage its economic slump from 
2014 to 2016.245 It is therefore likely that a leading motive for Russian MTC with Algeria 
is to increase the state’s foreign military sales, especially when an economic downturn 
occurs.  
 
241 Adapted from SIPRI, “TIV of Arms Exports from Russia, 2000–2018.” 
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c. H2c: Russia Engages in MTC to gain access to Natural Resources 
Russia does not engage in MTC to Algeria to gain access to natural resources in 
Algeria. Russia does not need access Algeria’s primary export, gas, because of its own 
abundant gas resources. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 9, Russia does not import much 
of Algeria’s other natural resource exports: petroleum, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead 
and zinc. Russia does not consume many of Algeria’s metal exports. As seen in Figure 9, 
Russia instead gets the majority of its metals from Europe and Asia.  
 
Figure 9. Where Did Russia Import Metals From? 246 
In fact, as seen in Figure 10, Algerian exports of metals dropped significantly after 2008. 
 
 
246 Source: “Where Did Russia Import Metals from Between 2000 and 2018?,” Atlas of Economic 





Figure 10. Where Algeria Exported Metals to from 2000 – 2018247 
Instead, Figure 11 shows that since 2010, over 50% of Russian imports from 
Algeria have been agriculture products, specifically avocados, pineapples, and mangos.248  
 
 
247 Source: “Where Did Algeria Export Metals to Between 2000 and 2018?,” Atlas of Economic 
Complexity, accessed November 6, 2020, https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/
stack?country=66&year=2018&startYear=2000&productClass=HS&product=4&target=Product&partner=
undefined. 
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Figure 11. Algeria Gross Exports (in Millions USD)—Russia249  
These trends are broader trends of economic growth and not specific to Russian 
MTC nor Russian involvement in the Algerian economy. Because Russian MTC did not 
have an impact on the overall growth of exports based on these trends, Russian MTC is not 
motivated by gaining access to Algerian natural resources.   
d. H2d: Russia Engages in MTC to Create Investment Opportunities for 
Russian SOEs 
Russian MTC is used to create Russian SOE investment opportunities. It is 
important to note that natural resources create lucrative opportunities for SOEs; however, 
SOEs are not interested in resources for the sake of access to resources, but instead 
interested in the investment opportunities. SOEs are driven by profits and, in the case of 
SOEs in Algeria, it just happens that the SOEs with the largest profit opportunities are 
connected to natural resource production.  
 
249 Source: “What Did Algeria Export to Russia Between 2000–2018?,” Atlas of Economic 




Putin’s meeting in 2006 about Algeria debt relief opened the door for Russian SOEs 
in Algeria by providing them with investment opportunities in the energy industry. While 
much of the discussion during Putin’s visit to Algeria in 2006 focused on the Algerian 
Soviet-era debt and arms deals, Darbouche argues that “the working formula of the deal 
provided for part of the Algerian debt to be ceded for Russian investment…the Russian 
were interested above all in Algeria’s state-owned oil company, the ‘untouchable’ 
Sonatrach.”250 Indicating Russia’s interest in energy investments, Gazprom and other 
energy company executives traveled to Algiers with Putin for the meeting.251 Darbouche 
observes that the media’s focus on the resulting arms deals overshadowed “Russia’s 
appetite for Algeria’s strategic gas (particularly LNG) assets.”252 Similarly, a 2007 Centre 
for European Policy Studies Policy Brief claimed the true incentive of the Algerian debt 
relief was to allow Russian SOEs to invest in Algerian energy projects: 
Upon first contact with Sonatrach, the Russian authorities eyed a stake in 
the Algerian company, hoping to use a $4.7 billion debt cancellation as a 
bargaining-chip. Behind the offer was hunger for LNG technology and 
expertise and participation in key pipeline projects linking Algeria to 
Europe ([Gasdotto Algeria-Sardegna Italia] GALSI in particular).253 
This opened the door for further MTC agreements and SOE investment in energy 
projects. Gazprom and the Algerian company Sonatrach signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) in August 2006.254 The MOU led to several deals, including a 
memorandum of understanding in 2008 between Gazprom and the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian state-owned petroleum company, concerning “a 
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trans-Sahara pipeline that would transport Nigerian gas across Niger and Algeria for 
delivery to Europe via Algerian export terminals.”255 
In addition, in 2008, Gazprom International obtained contracting rights for the El 
Assel block, an onshore gas site 150km outside the oil capital of Algeria, Hassi 
Messaoud.256 A supplemental agreement was made in 2009, leading to the formalization 
of Gazprom International’s involvement in a project across three blocks at the El Assel 
Block. Gazprom International owns a 49% share as the operation, while Sonatrach owns a 
51% share as the partner and co-investor.257 As of 2016, this project, had resulted in four 
discoveries of oil and gas fields in the area. The agreement is valid until 2039, 
demonstrating Russia’s long-term interest in resources in Algeria. In 2017, Transneft, the 
Russian energy SOE that focuses on pipelines, and Gazprom cooperated with Sonatrach 
on pipeline construction projects in Algeria.258 According to the Transneft website, 
Algeria and Russia “expressed their intention to collaborate in such areas as non-
destructive testing and safer operation of the pipeline infrastructure.”259  
In the newest SOE agreement, Rosgeologia, a geological exploration company, 
worked on a development project from 2017 to 2019 for the development of solid 
commercial minerals, specifically gold, nickel, cobalt, and 9 other minerals.260 While the 
details on this project are limited, Rosegeologia’s website states it completed an analysis 
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of mineral and raw materials base in addition to a technical audit. Rosegeologia submitted 
three sites with a total of 99 fields to the customer for further consideration.261  
Russian MTC to Algeria correlated with these SOE energy projects throughout the 
2000s. Russian arms exports to Algeria peaked in 2008 and 2016 (Figure 8). The SOE 
energy agreements occurred around the same time; the first in 2006 with a follow up in 
2007, the second in 2008 with a follow up in 2009, and a third in 2017. While it is difficult 
to establish with certainty whether Russia’s energy agreements and investments were a 
direct result of increases in arms sales, it is likely it was at least a factor in the signing of 
deals with Russian SOEs. Alternatively, it is possible that investments by energy SOEs 
instead led to an increase of Russian MTC to Algeria as an additional incentive to allow 
Russian SOE investment in Algeria. 
e. H2e: Russia engages in MTC to economically satisfy the regime’s 
domestic political clients 
Russia likely utilizes MTC to economically satisfy the regime’s domestic political 
clients. Many of the SOEs with interests in Algeria are managed by Putin’s political clients, 
such as energy and grain exportation companies. Gazprom’s CEO, Alexey Miller, served 
under Putin in the 1990s on the Committee for External Relations of the Saint Petersburg 
Mayor’s office.262 In 2000, he became Russia’s deputy minister of energy—an 
appointment that coincided with Putin’s ascension to President.263 In 2001, Miller was 
appointed CEO of Gazprom, a maneuver orchestrated by Putin to reward Miller for his 
loyalty. Miller then filled Gazprom with Putin loyalists.264 Miller most likely personally 
benefits from Gazprom’s projects in Algeria. The importance of this relationship is clear 
as Gazprom executives were part of Putin’s delegation during his 2006 visit to Algiers and 
has been the primary SOE engaged in Algeria.265 In addition, Rosegeologia’s Director 
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General and Chairman of the Board is Sergey Gorkov, chairman of the state-run bank 
Vnesheconombank and a close associate of Putin.266  
The developing Algerian-Russian grain market is another opportunity to reward 
Putin’s clients. According to the Institute for the Study of War, “Russia is attempting to 
capture a larger share of the continent’s wheat market, particularly in Algeria, Morocco, 
and Libya.”267 In 2018, Mintec, a data and analytic platform covering raw material, food 
ingredients, and non-food raw material, estimated Russia would dominate the Algerian 
wheat market due to a decline of French wheat exports to Algeria as weather conditions 
caused bad crop production in 2015.268 Russia sent its first batch of grain to Algeria in 
2020. As Russian oligarchs are tied into Russia’s grain market, Algeria could become a 
more evident case study of satisfying the Russian oligarchs in the future as these oligarchs 
are known to receive kickbacks from these sales. In turn, the oligarchs continue their 
support for Putin’s regime. Therefore, it is likely Russian MTC is motivated by supporting 
domestic political clients. 
f. Economic Conclusions 
Russian MTC to Algeria is economically motivated to increase arms sales to 
expand the Russian arms market as well as find investment opportunities through SOEs. 
The increase of Russian MTC to Algeria also provided SOE additional investment 
opportunities. In addition, Putin’s domestic clients gain economically through MTC deals 
as they benefit off of company investments that the clients are involved in.  
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E. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
Russian MTC in Algeria is motivated mostly by economic motivations; however 
this case study demonstrates how political and economic motivations are intertwined. On 
the political side, Russian MTC to Algeria is motivated by strengthening diplomatic ties 
with Algeria. It is not motivated by a desire to induce partner countries to support Russian 
positions in international institutions or to displace/antagonize the West. Russian MTC to 
Algeria might be motivated by countering extremism or gaining military access in Algeria, 
but it is difficult to be definitive as access to military information and counter extremism 
operations and agreements is limited. However, Russian interest in Libya and its interest 
in counter extremism generally make it likely that Russia uses MTC similarly in Algeria.  
On the economic side, Russia’s motivations for MTC to Algeria primarily focuses 
on access to the Algerian arms market, by investment opportunities for Russian SOEs, and 
by economically satisfying Putin’s domestic clients as they often hold positions of power 
in the SOEs. The support of domestic clients maintains Putin’s hold on power, which 
economically benefits the oligarchs. Russian MTC to Algeria is not motivated by 
increasing access to the general Algerian market or by obtaining access to natural 
resources. 
The case study also shows that Russia’s political and economic motives are 
intertwined. Russian MTC centers on a desire to secure economic opportunities for regime 
clients, which helps to ensure Putin’s political survival. Bolstering diplomatic ties and 
countering extremism serves Putin’s political goals for Algeria and Africa writ-large. The 
deepening of ties also enables Russian access for economic opportunities, which benefit 
regime clients and bolster Putin’s domestic power, The next chapter compares these results 
with that of Sudan to determine patterns of Russian motivations for MTC in Africa.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A better understanding of Russian motivations for involvement in Africa can help 
determine the degree to which Russian actions are a threat to U.S. foreign policy interests 
in Africa or to U.S. national security. This thesis has examined MTC because it is Russia’s 
favored and best-documented activity in Africa. The precise motivations for Russian MTC 
in Africa vary across the case studies. However, the thesis consistently found support for 
one hypothesis regarding Russian motivations for MTC in Africa: a desire to economically 
satisfy the Putin regime’s domestic clients (H2e). In addition, based on the available 
evidence, two hypothesized motives for Russian MTC can be rejected: gaining access to 
natural resources (H2c) and increase market for Russian exports (H2a). Neither of these 
hypotheses was supported for either Algeria or Sudan. Overall, this thesis finds support for 
both political and economic explanations for Russian MTC; however, many of the political 
hypotheses resulted in mixed outcomes. Finally, the remainder of the hypotheses that were 
not mixed results but were positive for one country and negative for another, show the 
variation between political and economic motivations for Russian MTC across Sudan and 
Algeria.  
Because Russian MTC in both Sudan and Algeria provides economic benefits to 
oligarchs, which satisfies the clients and keeps Putin in power, whether or not it is a threat 
to U.S. foreign policy interests depends on the perceived or actual threat of Putin’s hold on 
power. If the United States is concerned about Putin strengthening his regime, then it 
should be concerned about the resurgence of Russian MTC in Africa.  
The remainder of this chapter compares the results from Sudan and Algeria to 
determine whether any other explanations can be accepted as a driver of Russian MTC. It 
also addresses rejected hypotheses and mixed results across the two countries, 
demonstrating that Russian motivations for MTC in Africa are varied and tailored to each 
country. Then, this chapter describes the challenges in the research process for this project, 
leading to future research questions that this thesis did not address. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with implications for United States foreign policy toward Africa. 
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A. CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED HYPOTHESES  
1. Domestic Political Clients  
The case studies of Sudan and Algeria demonstrate that Russia engages in MTC to 
satisfy the Putin regime’s domestic political clients. In both case studies, Russian MTC 
supports domestic clients by providing them investment opportunities through SOEs or 
private companies, in which the regime’s domestic clients often have leadership roles. For 
Putin, satisfying his domestic clients means that they continue to support him. In a regime 
such as his, strong internal support of key players who can directly support Putin’s interests 
are key to his ability to maintain power. The benefits domestic clients receive from MTC 
ensure that the oligarchs are happy, which in turn supports Putin and his interests. 
B. CONSISTENTLY UNSUPPORTED HYPOTHESES 
1. Natural Resources 
The case studies of Sudan and Algeria demonstrate that Russian MTC is not 
motivated by gaining access to African natural resources. In both case studies, the limited 
amount of natural resources exported to Russia by Sudan and Algeria could indicate that 
Russia had little interest in the countries’ natural resources from 2000–2018. That said, an 
additional explanation, which is addressed in section D, is that Russia failed to obtain 
resources through its MTC relationships. Additionally, Africa is one of the most resource-
rich continents and has some resources that Russia does not possess in abundance. Just 
because Russia is not utilizing MTC to gain access to natural resources in Algeria and 
Sudan does not mean it is not interested in natural resources elsewhere. Russia may be 
interested in resource acquisition in other parts of Africa or may be using other means that 
are not MTC to gain access to it. However the evidence available for these two cases 
generally does not support this hypothesis.  
2. Increase market for Russian Exports Generally 
The cases of Sudan and Algeria indicate that Russian MTC is not motivated by 
increasing the market for Russian exports generally. Neither Algeria nor Sudan have ever 
been a large export market for Russian goods. In both case studies, increases of Russian 
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exports to Sudan and Algeria did not correspond to spikes in Russian MTC. While trade 
with both of these countries might have increased over time, the increase might be 
facilitated by something else and not Russian MTC. For Sudan, the increases in trade might 
be more closely linked to regime stability and in Algeria they might be linked to general 
development of trade relations. Further research is required to determine what led to the 
general increase in Russian exports to these markets. But for this study, this hypothesis was 
not supported across either of the case studies. 
C. HYPOTHESES WITH MIXED RESULTS 
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results for the other seven hypotheses. Russian 
political motivations for MTC vary across the two cases and include strengthening 
diplomatic ties, gaining support in international institutions, countering extremism, and 
displacing/antagonizing the West. With respect to economic motivations, Russian MTC 
seeks to increase the market for Russian arms and create investment opportunities for 
SOEs.  
Significantly, these findings demonstrate that Russian motivations for MTC in 
Africa vary substantially, even across only two countries. These results indicate that Russia 
is flexible in its approach to Africa and will likely continue to utilize MTC differently 
depending on the country it engages with. The lack of consistency is important for two 
reason. First, it contrasts with prior literature, which argues that Russia is pursuing a 
coherent pan-African GPC strategy. Second, it supports existing arguments that Russia’s 
approach to MTC in Africa is opportunistic. The hypotheses with mixed results 
demonstrate that Russia tailors its strategy to each country based on its flexible approach 
to Africa in order to support both its strategic goals as well as Putin’s personal goals.  
However, while Russia may not have a grand, political ambition of MTC use in 
Africa, it is intentional about where and how it devotes its time and resources. This is 
evident from the variety in Russia’s use of MTC and could indicate that Russia looks to 
capitalize on opportunities present in each country to maximize benefits to either Russian 
strategic goals or Putin’s personal goals. The hypotheses with mixed results across Sudan 
and Algeria demonstrate that Russia varies its engagement based on both political and 
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economic motivations. The tailored strategy of Russian MTC to Sudan and Algeria poses 
future research questions as well as policy implications for the United States if it wants to 
counter Russia in Africa.  
Table 7. Comparing Political Motivations in Sudan and Algeria 
Table 8. Comparing Economic Motivations in Sudan and Algeria 
 Sudan (Y/N) Algeria (Y/N) 
H2a: Increase market for Russian exports generally N N 
H2b: Increase market for Russian arms N Y 
H2c: Obtain access to natural resources  N N 
H2d: Create investment opportunities for Russian SOEs N Y 




There were four primary challenges encountered during this project. The first was 
a lack of public data on MTC relating to military agreements, exercises, and basing rights. 
The second was a problem of endogeneity with respect to MTC, which is some cases was 
potentially acting as a dependent variable instead of an independent variable. The third was 
the nature and assumptions of the research methods. The fourth was the scope of the project 
and its generalizability to other parts of Africa.  
  Sudan (Y/N) Algeria (Y/N) 
H1a: Strengthen diplomatic ties  N Y 
H1b: Gain support in international institutions Mixed N 
H1c: Gain military access Mixed Mixed 
H1d: Counter extremism N Mixed 
H1e: Displace/Antagonize the West Mixed N 
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1. Restricted Data 
Data on Russian MTC is fairly restricted and controlled. The majority of the 
information for this project came from think tanks and newspaper reports. Data was a 
limitation, and with more in-depth data, such as further details on military agreements 
between Russia and Algeria, the hypotheses can be reassessed. Furthermore, the temporal 
scope of this project limited the data available for the study: in the interest of taking a 
historic approach to Russian MTC in Algeria and Sudan, it was capped at 2018.  
However, during the progress of this study, more information came to light about 
Russian MTC in Africa throughout the year 2020. Therefore, further research is needed to 
determine if any new information, either in the form of detailed reports from 2000 to 2018 
or information post-2018, impacts the results of this study. The lack of detailed reports and 
information had the most significant impact on the hypothesis relating to military access to 
African countries (H1c). Publicly available information on military exercises, troop 
numbers, military agreements, and other military engagements is limited. Because of this 
lack of information, it was difficult to determine if MTC was motivated by gaining military 
access to African countries. There is the possibility that Russia wants to gain military 
access and it seems logical that MTC would facilitate that goal; however, since we do not 
see clear outcomes of Russia gaining military access to these countries, the structure of the 
study resulted in a negative determination.  
Furthermore, it is possible that, while several hypotheses were not supported in this 
historical analysis, they could be in the future. Since 2018, Russian and American interests 
in Africa have been shifting. Unlike during the Cold War era and the Yeltsin era, this new 
resurgence into Africa is not primarily motivated by just political or just economic 
motivations. Instead, as this study has revealed, the Putin era is characterized by a blend of 
political and economic motivations. Finally, it is possible that international dynamics have 
changed considerably in the last few years, correlating with the United States’ growing 
concern about Russia in Africa. Because this study ended in 2018, those changes would 
not be represented in its results.  
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2. Endogeneity 
In addition, this project did not address the problem of endogeneity. There is a 
possibility that some of the findings are endogenous. For example, rather than Russia 
engaging in MTC to create opportunities for SOE investment, SOE investments could have 
led to an increase in Russian MTC. This concern is particularly relevant for the hypotheses 
about diplomatic ties, international institutions, increasing the market generally as well as 
for arms, and creating investment opportunities for SOEs because there is the possibility 
these outcomes spurred Russian MTC instead of Russian MTC leading to these outcomes.  
As was addressed in earlier chapters, Russian MTC takes time to order, ship, 
organize, and execute. What happens behind closed doors is also another matter entirely. 
MTC agreements could have been in the works between governments away from the public 
eye. The sometimes hidden nature of MTC makes pinpointing the causal relationship 
between MTC and motivations difficult. While this project attempted to minimize this issue 
by choosing specific indicators for each hypothesis, such as diplomatic agreements signed 
after an MTC deal, it is possible that the relationships are more complex than the 
parameters of this study allowed for.  
3. Assumption that outcomes demonstrate motivations 
Because it is very difficult to assess the Putin’s regime’s motivations directly, this 
project observed outcomes to evaluate motivations for Russian MTC. While observing 
outcomes enabled the study to established clear indicators for assessing the hypotheses, 
these indicators were simplifications. More importantly, the study assumed that the 
observed outcomes in Sudan and Algeria were Russia’s desired outcomes. If a correlation 
was not observed between MTC and a specified outcome, the study concluded that Russia 
did not use MTC to achieve that outcome. This approach does not consider the possibility 
that Russian attempted to utilize MTC to achieve a desired outcome but that the effort 
failed or had an unintended outcome. Consequently, it is possible that the observed 
indicators were not measuring Russia’s true motives. The study utilized this approach to 
simplify the complexities of motivations in order to make motivations measurable. Ideally, 
future studies would be able to examine not only observed outcomes, but efforts that did 
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not come to fruition and more nuanced outcomes to delve into more detailed motivations. 
This method would be difficult to successfully carry out in one study and shows the need 
for future research in this area. Furthermore, further studies would encounter the same 
problem of assumptions due to a lack of direct access to Putin’s motivations and the 
potential variability of motivations over time. 
4. Generalizability  
Due to time limitations and research constraints, this study was limited in its 
geographic scope. While country studies of Sudan and Algeria provide insight into Russian 
MTC motivations in Africa, Africa consists of over 50 countries. Just as Sudan and Algeria 
presented different outcomes, it is likely that results would continue to vary if studies 
incorporated more countries in Africa. Even the hypotheses that were supported or rejected 
in both of these cases might produce different results in other countries. Based on the 
variation between Algeria and Sudan, it is likely that Russian motivations for MTC do vary 
significantly across different countries in Africa, depending on what Russian interests are 
at the time and whether each country can fulfill those interests. One factor that could 
contribute to this variation is the historical relationship between Russia and each African 
country. Both Sudan and Algeria had a Cold War relationship with Russia. Some countries 
where Russia is attempting to build influence do not have the same historical Cold War 
ties. This variation in background could also impact the motivations of Russian MTC in 
Africa. Ultimately, further research needs to be done to determine if the results from this 
study do in fact apply across Africa writ large. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this project had certain limitations, it illuminated several opportunities for 
future research. Further research on each individual motivation should be conducted if 
more information were to become available. This would enable a deeper investigation into 
indicators of MTC and the potential political and economic outcomes. In addition, future 
research should consider studies that focus more broadly on overarching political or 
economic motivations of MTC. It is possible there are more motivations that were not 
addressed in this thesis, and these motivations should be studied. Finally, this thesis 
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revealed the importance of blended motivations of Russian MTC to Africa. Motivations 
are complex and not just purely economic or political. Future research should explore 
blended motivations that reflect the complex nature of motivations.  
F. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
As the United States decides how to move forward with its partnerships in Africa, 
it should keep in mind the potential threats Russia poses: Senior national security officials 
have characterized Russian presence in Africa as a threat to the U.S.269 This thesis finds 
evidence that challenges this perspective. Given U.S. policy goals in Africa, which are to 
“Promot[e] prosperity in Africa and America … Strengthen security … to counter threats 
to American and African security … [and] Strive for stability to support progress toward 
good governance and self-reliance,”270 based on the findings of this study, it can be argued 
that Russian MTC supports more domestic goals than challenging U.S. foreign policy 
goals.  
Based on these dynamics, Russian MTC specifically seems to create fewer 
challenges for African governments than it does for the United States. While Russian MTC 
benefits domestic oligarchs, it seems like African political leaders also benefit from 
Russian MTC because it helps their military and repressive capacity. In addition, regimes 
such as Bashir’s in Sudan thought Russia provided the state with more sovereignty contrary 
to the perceived American “imperialism.” These are MTC challenges that the United States 
will have to contend with if it hopes to compete with Russia in Africa.  
However, in the cases of Sudan and Algeria, both Bashir and the Bouteflika are no 
longer in power and the new regimes have more interest in working with the United States. 
It remains to be seen if an increase of cooperation with the West will continue. But because 
of Russia’s strong historical ties and MTC integration, the United States might have fewer 
opportunities to grow MTC investments with Algeria and Sudan to where it would be 
competitive with Russian MTC.  
 
269 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton.” 
270 White House. 
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The United States’ recent interest in expanding its own MTC to Algeria is 
encouraging because it supports protecting American interests as well as pursuing 
American foreign policy goals in Africa. Efforts to grow defense ties between the United 
States and Algeria should continue because even if it does not change the relationship 
between Algeria and Russia, this is an opportunity that was not previously available to the 
United States.271 The United States should take advantage of it while the door is open. In 
addition, with increased cooperation and effort in building a relationship between the 
United States and Algeria, other African governments might be more willing to work with 
the United States and provide opportunities that benefit their and American interests, as 
well as counter Russia as the United States operates in the expanding GPC era.  
This study illuminates numerous opportunities for United States outreach toward 
Africa. If the United States believes that GPC is truly a threat in Africa, one approach it 
should take is to tailor policy towards spoiling benefits to Russian domestic clients in 
Africa, which may disincentivize the same practices in other African countries. The case 
studies reveal that Russian MTC consistently benefits Russian oligarchs, which in turn 
bolster Putin’s regime. In Sudan, MTC enabled Prigozhin’s involvement by providing 
PMCs to the Bashir regime while Prigozhin’s private companies, like M Invest, most likely 
received financial kickbacks. In Algeria, oligarchs often sit on the board of large SOEs, 
which gives them access to the SOE and thereby benefits from large contract and 
investment projects. The funneling of benefits to domestic clients in turn bolsters Putin as 
the chef d’état. While the United States cannot control who is in charge of the Russian 
SOEs nor which oligarchs benefit from deals in Africa, there is a possibility that if oligarchs 
lose their access and benefits, they will shift their attention away from Africa. By spoiling 
benefits to Russian domestic clients, Putin might be less incentivized to maintain certain 
types of MTC to Africa such as PMCs.  
One way to spoil benefits for Russian oligarchs is to strengthen MTC ties between 
the United States and non-authoritarian African governments. Increasing MTC cooperation 
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between the United States and non-authoritarian African governments may take away from 
potential Russian MTC gains and SOE benefits. This does not necessarily mean American 
influence will increase in the country, however it may impact the economic benefits 
Russian oligarchs receive. The best way to accomplish a shift in oligarch attention is to 
encourage African countries to either pick the United States as an MTC partner over what 
the Russian oligarchs and SOEs offer. This means the United States would have to become 
more involved in Africa than it already is, but does not necessitate committing an exorbitant 
amount of resources. Instead, the United States could take a page from Putin’s play book 
and be intentional and strategic on where it invests in MTC in Africa. While there are 
challenges in this proposal due to western values that limit the United States from working 
with authoritarian regimes, the United States can pursue opportunities where they are 
feasible and available. Algeria and Sudan, both with their new governments and interest 
growing westward, are examples of this. But without an alternative option to Russian MTC, 
the oligarch businesses and benefits will expand in Africa and continue supporting Putin.  
Simultaneously, these ties would create new partnerships and further establish the 
United States in the GPC-era. Some efforts have been made since 2018 and should continue 
to move in this direction. The United States Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited 
Algiers in October 2020 in response to the Trump Administration’s efforts to “push back 
on Russian and Chinese influence in the region.”272 Even following the Trump 
Administration’s announcement regarding the draw-down of AFRICOM, General Stephen 
Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command stated “[The United States] would 
like to strengthen our ties with Algeria, and [the United States] look[s] forward to both 
increasing engagements and furthering [its] cooperation.”273 The United States should 
avoid the Russian rhetoric trap of stating one intention without follow through and continue 
to pursue these options, especially while countries like Algeria and Sudan show interest in 
strengthening ties.  
 





Looking toward the future, it is increasingly important to understand Russia’s 
motivations within Africa as the United States enters a new period of GPC. Understanding 
Russia’s motivations within Africa can help explain Russia’s motivations elsewhere in the 
world as the United States competes for strategic influence across the globe. Russian MTC 
can signal Russian strategic interests as they change and develop in the new period of GPC. 
This study may give insight into how other states could employ MTC in Africa to expand 
their influence. Furthermore, it illuminates potential motivations of Russian MTC in Sudan 
and Algeria which can be used as a template to study Russian MTC elsewhere.  
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